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Preface

This paper begins with a general introduction to the two foci of this study:
namely, the poetry of Jalāl al-Din Rūmī and the cognitive sciences. At first glance, these
two topics may seem to be strange bedfellows. The time has come, however, to
incorporate the revolutionary discoveries in the cognitive sciences into our treatments of
Rūmī’s lyrics and Persian and Arabic literature more generally. Their introduction, in fact,
is long overdue.
Cognitive science has, for the first time, provided us a window into the inner
workings of the human mind-brain. This extraordinary opportunity allows us now, as
literary scholars, to examine not only language as it is produced (i.e. in texts), but also to
examine the exceedingly complex processes by which readers understand texts and
language generally. The insights we can glean from this unprecedented access to the
source of linguistic production and comprehension have the potential to significantly
improve our literary analyses and our translations, as I will demonstrate in this study.
The first half of this work then will introduce the field of cognitive science and its
most relevant insights for the analysis of literature generally, and mystical poetry
specifically. The second half of this work will be a detailed case study of one of Rūmī’s
ghazals (#1919), in which I will both analyze and critique its translations utilizing
cognitive literary criticism.

vi

In the end, I hope that the present “cognitive literary study” of Rūmī’s ghazal
#1919 serves both as a solid introduction to the cognitive approach to literature as well as
a catalyst for future cognitive studies in the areas of Persian and Arabic Literature.
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INTRODUCTION

Rūmī and the Cognitive Sciences
The Poet, His Poetry, and a New Way Forward

The Poet and His Historical Context
Mowlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Muhammad Balkhī Rūmī was born in the
city Balkh (located in present-day Afghanistan) in 1207 CE. However, his stay in the land
of his birth was short-lived. Rūmī’s father, after some disagreements with the local
religious leadership, made the decision to relocate the family, eventually settling in the
Anatolian city of Konya, in modern-day Turkey.
From an early age, Rūmī was groomed to take over his father’s position in the
Konyan community as the head of the local congregation and professor in the madrasa.
He was sent to the famous Islamic centers of learning in Aleppo and Damascus for this
purpose, where he received the best traditional Islamic education possible in the the areas
of Qur’anic Studies, Hadith Studies, and Islamic Law.1
The most important influence in Rūmī’s spiritual life (and, later, his poetry),
however, was the Islamic mystical tradition of Sufism. The traditional accounts of Rūmī’s
dramatic mid-life conversion to Sufism at the hands of the legendary Shams of Tabrīz are

Franklin Lewis, Rūmī, Past and Present, East and West: The Life, Teachings and Poetry of Jalāl al-Dīn
Rūmī (Oxford, UK: Oneworld, 2000), 272-274; Fatemeh Keshavarz, Reading Mystical Lyric: The Case of
Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1998), 4-6.
1

1

likely misleading. Although Shams gave Rūmī unprecedented levels of mystical
inspiration (which should not be dismissed as insignificant), it is nevertheless quite
unlikely that Rūmī changed over night from a legalistic Islamic preacher, professor, and
judge who did not write any poetry into a “drunken” Sufi who produced tens of
thousands of lines of poetry. 2
In reality, Rūmī’s father had always been heavily inclined towards Sufi thought
and had many mystical visions and writings of his own. Moreover, Rūmī’s mentor after
the death of his father, Borhān al-Dīn Termezī, was an adherent of the Sufi path and is
likely the one who officially initiated Rūmī into Sufism in his early twenties.3

Sufism
Sufism, in brief, is the “major mystical tradition in Islam.”4 It is characterized by
an inward, ascetical orientation and a concern for the inner meaning of the phenomenal
world. Sufis believe that true knowledge (ma’rifa) of the “Truth/Reality” (al-haqq) is
only achievable thorough spiritual (i.e. mystical) experience, which is ultimately what the
Sufi path (tarīqa) aims to guide its disciples (murīd) towards.
The ultimate goal of the Sufi path is, simply stated, mystical union with God. The
exact nature of this union between the individual sufi and God, however, is a matter of
considerable dispute within Sufism generally. The emphasis on the unity of God (tawhīd),

2

Keshavarz, Reading Mystical Lyric, 6-7.

3

Lewis, Rūmī, 104-108, 159-161, 272-275.

4

Ahmet T. Karamustafa, Sufism: The Formative Period (Berkley: University of California Press, 2007), 1.
2

humankind, and the universe generally is very important in Sufism (although its exact
nature likewise is bitterly disputed), and particularly so in the writings of Rūmī.5
The pinnacle of the Sufi path (i.e. unity with God) can only be achieved when the
sufi achieves fanā’ , which roughly translates as the “dissolution” or “passing away of
[lower, human] self-consciousness [nafs].”6 In the view of the Sufis, the “lower (human)
self” must be conquered (through ascetical practices) and ultimately recognized for the
illusion that it perpetuates—i.e. that there is a reality other than God: “From the
perspective of the Sufis, as long as you remain ‘yourself’ [nafs, lower self], you cannot
know God: the greatest veil between you and Reality is being ‘yourself’ [nafs, lower
human self].”7
The process and culmination of fanā’ is most often—and this is especially true in
terms of Rūmī’s writings—allegorized as falling madly in love, with special emphasis on
the attendant rush of emotions, loss of rationality, and dissolution of the boundaries of
selfhood. Even more controversially, some Sufis, and especially Rūmī, employ the
metaphor of “drunkenness” and its associated imagery (such as “wine” [maī, sharāb]) to
describe the feeling of being madly in love with God and the altered state of
consciousness and perception that it produces in them.8

5

Karamustafa, Sufism, 1-3, 16-21; Javad Nurbakhsh, "The Key Features of Early Persian Sufism," in The
Heritage of Sufism: Classical Persian Sufism from Its Origin to Rūmī (700-1300), edited by Leonard
Lewisohn (Oxford: Oneworld, 1999), xxxvi-xl.
6

Karamustafa, Sufism, 16-17.

7

Nurbakhsh, The Key Features of Early Persian Sufism, xviii-xxvi.

Carl W. Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to Sufism (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1997) 43, 146-172;
Nurbakhsh, The Key Features of Early Persian Sufism, xix-xxi; Karamustafa, Sufism, 21; Keshavarz,
Reading Mystical Lyric, 27.
8

3

‘Divān-i Shams’ and the Persian Ghazal
For someone who frequently lamented the inadequacy of words, Rūmī sure wrote
voluminously. At least sixty thousand verses are attributed to him, spread across his two
most important works: the Masnavī and the Divān-i Shams-i Tabrīzi. While audiences
have long appreciated the depth of Rūmī’s mystical wisdom clearly on display in his
Masnavi (a didactical poetic work)—affectionately and appropriately termed, “The
Qur’ān in Persian”—Rūmī’s poetic genius in the Divān-i Shams has traditionally
received less attention.9
Divān-i Shams is a massive collection of Rūmī’s shorter poems (approximately
thirty-five thousand verses), primarily of the Persian ghazal genre. The Persian ghazal
was originally a sung poem that usually treated the themes of love and wine. It was also
considered to be a less formal poetic form—at least when compared to the qasīda form,
which was more closely linked to the royal court culture. Traditionally, the ghazal had
been produced for performances at informal gatherings and wine parties, which made it
easily transferable to the informal Sufi prayer sessions (samā’), where music, dance,
prayer, and poetry all coalesced. All of these factors made it ripe for adoption by the
Persian Sufis, and beginning with Sanā’i (d. 1131), this genre became one of the most
popular forms for the expression of mystical love poetry.10

9

Lewis, Rūmī, 300-307; Keshavarz, Reading Mystical Lyric, 1-3.

J.T.P. de Bruijn, Persian Sufi Poetry: An Introduction to the Mystical Use of Classical Persian Poems
(Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997), 54-57, 63, 68-69; J. Meisami, "Genres of Court Literature," in General
Introduction to Persian Literature, ed. J.T.P de Bruijn (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 244-246; Keshavarz,
Reading Mystical Lyric, 140-145.
10
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In terms of form, the ghazal is normally between five and fifteen lines and it
utilizes the same rhyme scheme as the qasīda form, namely:11
...a/...a
...b/...a
...x/...a
The meter of the ghazal form, like Persian poetry generally, is highly complex. In
fact, there exist over two hundred different possible prosodic patterns in the Persian
metrical system. The importance of this aspect of the ghazal form cannot be overstated,
as Persian Literature scholar and Rūmī specialist, Fatemeh Keshavarz, demonstrates quite
convincingly in her study of the “sonic intricacies” of Rūmī’s ghazals. She concludes that
the poetic meter, “sound patterns,” and “structural rhythm” of the individual ghazals all
play a central role in helping communicate the meaning of the poem to the reader/
listener.12
With this basic introduction to Rūmī, his historical context, and the works/generic
forms under consideration here, we will now move on to discuss the previous scholarship
on Rūmī’s lyrics.

Here “x” indicates that it can be any rhyme. This rhyme scheme chart is taken from: Wheeler M.
Thackston, A Millennium of Classical Persian Poetry (Bethesda: Iran Books, 1994), xxiv.
11

12

See, Keshavarz, Reading Mystical Lyric, 100-137.
5

The Scholarship on Rūmī:
The Roads Already Taken and A New Way Forward
The modern academic approaches to the study of Rūmī and his works can roughly
be divided into three categories. 13 While these categories are not absolute or mutually
exclusive, I think that a tripartite division is relatively accurate, provided it is treated only
as a flexible outline for viewing the history of Rūmī scholarship.

First Approach: Rūmī as Philological and Historical Artifact
The first category of Rūmī scholarship is the philological and historical approach.
The scholars of this school significantly increased our understanding of Rūmī and his
works through their meticulous historical accounts of his life and their critical editions,
translations, and commentaries on his works. Particularly prominent in this regard are
Reynold A. Nicholson (b. 1868), Hellmut Ritter (b. 1892), Badi’ al-Zamān Forouzanfar
(b. 1900), Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı (b. 1900), A.J. Arberry (b. 1905), Sādeq Gowharin (b.
1914), and Muhammad Este’lāmi (b. 1936).14 Franklin Lewis’ recent encyclopedic
overview of the life, works, and scholarship on Rūmī (Rūmī, Past and Present, East and
West, 2000) should also be mentioned in this category.

My division of the scholarship on Rūmī into three categories is roughly, although not exactly, based on
Franklin Lewis’ division of the various scholarly treatments of Rūmī and his work in his chapter, entitled
“A History of Rūmī Scholarship” in: Lewis, Rūmī, 528-563.
13

This is not intended to serve as a comprehensive introduction to the history of Rūmī scholarship. The
purpose of this section is only to provide a general context for the new approach of the present study.
Please see Lewis for a comprehensive account of the history of scholarship on Rūmī and his works: Lewis,
Rūmī, 528-563. Here I am drawing primarily on his study.
14
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Second Approach: Rūmī as a Philosophical/Mystical Teacher
The second scholarly approach to Rūmī has been primarily concerned with
understanding and explicating his religious, philosophical, and mystical teachings. The
late scholar of Sufism, Annemarie Schimmel (b. 1922), is probably the most prominent
representative of this group. However, other scholars such as Shebli No’māni (b. 1857),
Khalifa ‘Abdul Hakim, Afzal Iqbal (b. 1919), Parviz Morewedge (b. 1934), John Renard,
and William Chittick have made equally important contributions.15 Their approaches
share some similarities with the commentary tradition of the scholars of the first
approach, and, perhaps, the dividing line between these two categories is not always as
neat as I have made it out to be.

Third Approach: Rūmī as a Poet
The third category of scholars is composed of those who have taken a particular
interest in the poetics of Rūmī’s works—i.e. elements of style and structure, use of
literary tropes and metaphor, prosody, etc. Noteworthy here are Gustav Richter (b. 1906),
Annemarie Schimmel (b. 1922), Robert Rehder, J.C Bürgel, James Roy King, Gholam
Hosein Yousofi, Mehdi Borhāni, Sayyed Hosayn Fātemi, Sirus Shamisā, and Fatemeh
Keshavarz.16 What especially differentiates this third category from the first two is that
these scholars, in different ways, answer the basic question: how does Rūmī create
meaning? How does he use language, style, structure, literary tropes, and metaphor to

15

Lewis, Rūmī, 536-540, 559-560.

16

Lewis, Rūmī, 560-563.
7

“express the inexpressible” and turn “the funeral of words into a whirling dance?”, to
quote Fatemeh Keshavarz. 17

A New Way Forward: Cognitive Literary Criticism
The present work will continue in the tradition of the third approach in examining
Rūmī as a poet while utilizing a new theoretical framework for analyzing his poetry.
Specifically, I will approach Rūmī’s poetry from a cognitive perspective, using
theoretical and experimental insights from the field of cognitive science broadly to
further illuminate the dynamic ways in which he uses language to express that which he
frequently states is inexpressible linguistically.
Some may ask: “why cognitive science? How is this late twentieth/twenty-first
century field relevant to the study of the poetry of Rūmī?” The answer is very simple: one
of the primary concerns of cognitive science is the question of how the human mind
produces and understands meaning. Leading cognitive scientist Gilles Fauconnier even
claims that cognitive linguistics (a branch of cognitive science) is the first “genuine
science of meaning construction.”18
Cognitive studies of language not only investigate language as it is produced (i.e.
the surface or structural level), but they also probe the cognitive processes that produce it
and allow it to be understood/assign it meaning (i.e. the cognitive level). In other words,
cognitive scientists not only study languages, texts, grammars, meaning, etc., but also

17

Keshavarz, Reading Mystical Lyric, 12, 31.

Gilles Fauconnier, "Methods and Generalizations," in Cognitive Linguistics: Foundations, Scope, and
Methodology, ed. Theo Janssen and Gisela Redeker (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1999), 96.
18

8

study the complex cognitive processes that create these things in the first place—yielding
better insight into both.19
Explorations of the dynamic meaning creation in Rūmī’s poetry and the poetry of
other mystical writers is nothing new. However, the approach that I will employ in this
study is simply a new and fascinating way of understanding how Rūmī creates meaning
in his poetry and, conversely, how the millions (or, perhaps, billions!) of his faithful
readers have understood his mesmerizing verses throughout the ages.

Cognitive Science:
Mapping the Inner Workings of the Human Mind
Background
The term “cognitive science” (often times seen in the plural “cognitive sciences”)
refers to a broad interdisciplinary field of study whose uniting concern is understanding
how the human mind works (i.e. human cognition). It has its origins in Chomsky’s
rejection of the behaviorist paradigm (which eschewed references to human cognitive
processes in favor of directly observable, external phenomena) in the social sciences and
the rise of the artificial intelligence (AI) enterprise in the computer science. Both of these
movements began in earnest in the 1950s.
While much of Chomskian linguistics would later be rejected by cognitive
linguistics, and the AI field would find it impossible to replicate the human mind’s ability
to instantaneously process and create “meaning,” their initial reorientation of the social

Gilles Fauconnier, "Cognitive Science," Vol. 1, in Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, ed. Lynn Nadel
(New York: Nature Publishing Group, 2003), 542.
19

9

and “hard” sciences towards cognitive approaches was essential for the later development
of cognitive science in the late 1970s and early 1980s.20
Since then, the cognitive science enterprise has grown at an astonishing rate,
leading many scholars to talk of the “cognitive revolution” currently underway in the
academy.21 This is probably not an exaggeration: there are now well-developed cognitive
approaches in many (if not most) of the traditional academic disciplines, such as
psychology, philosophy, neuroscience, anthropology, and literature, which are all united
under the aegis of this broader term, “cognitive science(s).”22 Making hard distinctions
between these subfields of cognitive science—as their identification with specific,
traditionally quite disparate academic disciplines seems to suggest—however, is
somewhat misleading because all of the subfields deeply interpenetrate one another and
depend on each other’s research and discoveries for the collective advancement of the
larger cognitive understanding of the human mind.23

Mary Thomas Crane and Alan Richardson, "Literary Studies and Cognitive Science: Towards a New
Interdisciplinarity," Mosaic 32, no. 2 (1999): 123-126; Patrick Colm Hogan, Cognitive Science, Literature,
and the Arts (New York: Routledge, 2003), 29.
20

21

Hogan, Cognitive Science, Literature, and the Arts, 1.

Paul Thagard, "Cognitive Science", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), ed.
Edward N. Zalta <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/cognitive-science/>.
22

While this highly interdisciplinary approach is certainly laudable, it does create a bit of a terminological
problem if you try to remain bound to the tradition disciplinary distinctions. For example, this present study
utilizes insights from cognitive linguistics, cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and cognitive
philosophy in its discussion of mystical poetry and its analysis of Rūmī’s poetry, so then, how do I
characterize my approach in this study? Is it a cognitive linguistical approach? A cognitive psychological
approach? A cognitive philosophical approach? The most appropriate answer seems to be that it is none of
these individually; rather, it is best characterized simply as a cognitive approach to literature. Therefore, in
this study I will use the cognitive subfields (such as, cognitive linguistics, cognitive neuroscience, etc.)
indiscriminately, with the understanding that these are all a part of my larger cognitive approach to Rūmī’s
lyrics.
23
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General Principles of Cognitive Science
The single most unifying feature of cognitive studies is this guiding question: how
does the human mind process and/or understand x, y, or z phenomenon? (As opposed to
its immediate predecessor [i.e. behaviorism] which was primarily concerned with “what
happens when...” [i.e. the observable phenomena that result from the cognitive
processes]).
The second common feature in cognitive studies is the method they employ.
Regardless of whether the cognitive-oriented researcher is trying to understand how the
human mind processes language, creates group identity (ethnic, national, etc.), enjoys
music, forms and recalls memories, feels emotion, or understands human agency, all
cognitivists are likely to approach their study in a similar three step process:
1) What is the information and/or stimulus being processed?
2) What parts of our “cognitive architecture” (i.e. mental structures, processes, and
contents—more on these three elements later) are used in processing this information
and/or stimulus?
3) What is the sequence of and interrelation between these various elements of our
“cognitive architecture”?24
In other words, how precisely—even to the molecular level of detail—does our
mind do what it does? Cognitive science seeks primarily to fill in the huge gap left by
behaviorism: how/why do we respond the way we do to certain information/stimuli?

This tripartite division is based on Hogan’s summary of the basic methodological approach of cognitive
studies: Hogan, Cognitive Science, Literature, and the Arts, 29-31.
24
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Discovering exactly how our mind works down to the most minute cellular level
is not just pedantic neuroscience; on the contrary, it has wide-ranging practical
applications in business and politics, and its insights have already begun revolutionizing
other (seemingly unrelated) academic disciplines, such as philosophy, anthropology,
religious studies, and literature. For our purposes here, approaching Rūmī’s lyrics from
the perspective of cognitive science could be an exceedingly fruitful enterprise. The fields
of poetics and mysticism studies have long grappled with issues of language, experience,
and meaning—all of which cognitive science has struggled with as well, yielding
significant results that could shine new light on our studies of mystical poetry.

The Emerging Field of Cognitive Literary Criticism/Cognitive Poetics
Since the advent of cognitive science in the late 1970s, a significant number of
literary scholars have incorporated insights from the cognitive sciences into their studies
of literature. While initially scattered, these attempts at forming bridges between the
study of literature and the cognitive revolution underway in the sciences has now
coalesced into a discernible sub-field of literary studies, termed, alternatively, “cognitive
literary criticism” and/or “cognitive poetics.” This movement first achieved “official”
recognition in 1998 when the Modern Language Association (MLA) approved the
creation of the “Discussion Group on Cognitive Approaches to Literature” at its annual
convention.25

Alan Richardson and Francis F. Steen, "Literature and the Cognitive Revolution: An Introduction," in
Literature and the Cognitive Revolution, ed. Alan Richardson and Francis F. Steen (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 2002), 7.
25
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This emerging field is very diverse and its proponents have been working in a
wide range of areas within literary studies, as illustrated by Lisa Zunshine: literary
aesthetics (Elaine Scarry, Gabrielle Starr); feminism and gender studies (Elizabeth Grosz
and Elizabeth Hart); postcolonial studies (Patrick Colm Hogan, Frederick Luis Aldama);
deconstruction (Ellen Spolsky); cultural historicism (Mary Thomas Crane, Alan
Richardson, Blakey Vermeule); and narrative theory (Alan Palmer, David Herman, Uri
Margolin, Monika Fludernik, Porter Abbott).26 Additionally, literary scholars such as
Mark Turner and Reuven Tsur, as well as cognitive linguists/psychologists/philosophers,
such as George Lakoff, Gilles Fauconnier, Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr, and Mark Johnson,
have all made important theoretical contributions to the growing field. It is important to
note that the emerging field of cognitive literary criticism seeks to complement and
enrich the traditional fields of literary criticism; it does not purport to replace them, nor
could it.27
One of the biggest hurdles for the incorporation of cognitive approaches to
literature into the field of literary studies is that the science and terminology used in its
many recent treatments is often quite specialized and foreign to the literary specialist.
This situation in many ways has become much worse since George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson published their landmark study Metaphors We Live By in 1980, owing primarily
to the larger impact neuroscience and other so-called “hard” cognitive sciences are
making in the field. Many of the early foundational works in cognitive linguistics, such as
This listing of literary scholars working in the sub-field of cognitive literary studies has been adopted
from: Lisa Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel (Columbus: The Ohio State
University Press, 2006), 36-37.
26

27

Ibid., 37; Richardson and Steen, Literature and the Cognitive Revolution, 1-3, 6.
13

Lakoff and Turner’s trenchant study of poetic metaphor, More Than Cool Reason: A
Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor (1989), or even Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr.’s (a psychologist
by training) Poetics of the Mind: Figurative Thought, Language, and Understanding
(1994), are easily comprehensible to literary scholars. However, the more recent trends in
the field towards the extensive use of psychology and neuroscience have made it
increasingly difficult for the unacquainted literary scholar to understand the cognitive
science literature without considerable independent study.28
None of these difficulties, however, should deter literary specialists from
venturing into the relevant literature in the cognitive sciences. As I hope to show in this
study, the new cognitive understandings of everything from language theory to poetic
imagery and metaphor have the potential to revolutionize the way we understand
literature, poetry, and translation.

See the most recent work of Lakoff and Gibbs for examples of the far more extensive incorporation of
neuroscience and psychology into the field of cognitive literary theory: George Lakoff, "The Neural Theory
of Metaphor," in The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, ed. Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) and Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., “Metaphor and Thought: The State
of the Art,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, ed. Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2008). Also see: Jerome A. Feldman, From Molecule to Metaphor: A Neural
Theory of Language (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).
28
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CHAPTER I

The Cognitive Insights into the Human Mind-Brain and Language
The Foundational Premises of the Cognitive Theory of Language

Basic Premises
The current theory of language in cognitive science is premised on four basic
suppositions:
• Conceptual thought and language are “fundamentally metaphoric in nature.”
• Thought is composed of “structured neural activity,” which occurs mostly in the
“cognitive unconscious.”
• Language and thought cannot be disassociated from our embodied, sensorimotor
experience.
• Ergo, the human mind is inherently embodied—i.e. there is no mind-body dualism.29

Language and Metaphor
The basis for the cognitive theory of language began to develop in the late 1970s,
when cognitive science was still in its nascent stages of development, and burst onto the

For this reason, I will use the term “mind-brain,” instead of submitting to the dualistic false choice of
choosing either the term “mind” or “brain.” Sources for “Basic Premises” section: Feldman, From
Molecule to Metaphor, 3; Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., Embodiment and Cognitive Science (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 276; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 3; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the
Flesh: The Embodied Mind and the Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 3-8.
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academic scene in a major way with the publication of a book by George Lakoff (a
linguist) and Mark Johnson (a philosophy professor), entitled Metaphors We Live By
(1980). It began with this landmark statement:
Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the
rhetorical flourish—a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary
language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of
language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this
reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without
metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in
everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary
conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is
fundamentally metaphorical in nature.30
They astutely observed that even quotidian phrases, such as “I got it” (when
meaning: “I understand it”), “Life is going well,” “I am feeling kind of down today,” or
“He is not a close friend,” all are predicated on a metaphoric foundation. For example,
the phrase “I got it” (when meaning: “I understand it”) is based on the primary metaphor
UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING (AN OBJECT). 31 The corresponding negative phrase “I

lost it” or “I did not get it,” when used in this context, means “I did not understand” or “I
no longer understand,” and is also based on this same primary metaphor [see Table A,
below this section for more examples].
They identified two types of metaphors: primary and complex metaphors. Primary
metaphors, such as UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS,
CAUSES ARE PHYSICAL FORCES, SIMILIARITY IS CLOSENESS, AFFECTION IS
WARMTH, IMPORTANT IS BIG, or TIME IS MOTION, are the building blocks of complex

metaphors, such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY, DEATH IS NIGHT/LIFE IS DAY, or IDEAS ARE
30

Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 3.

31

Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 52.
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TOOLS. There are literally hundreds of primary metaphors which combine in

innummerable ways through the process of “conceptual blending” to form the similarly
innumerable number of complex metaphors that together structure much of our language
and thought.32
The important thing to notice about these and all other metaphors is that they are
all fundamentally based on our embodied experiences in the world. In other words, they
are “experientially grounded” in the sense that they draw on our sensorimotor
experiences for their logic, qualities, imagery, and image-schemas. For example, the
primary metaphor AFFECTION IS WARMTH is derived from the human experience of
feeling warm when in a loving embrace, while the primary metaphor UNDERSTANDING
IS GRASPING (AN OBJECT) is based on the experience of possessing and manipulating

objects and tools.
If much of both everyday and abstract thought and language is metaphoric, there
are two questions that need to be answered here: first, why do we use metaphoric
language in the first place? The short answer: it allows us to communicate a tremendous
amount of meaning very efficiently because it draws on the experiential resources of the
sensorimotor regions of our brain. Secondly, how does metaphoric language do this and
how do we understand it, especially when often times what it literally “means” is a
physical impossibility (e.g. “grasping” an idea, “kicking” a habit, “running” late)? The
short answer is through a process called “semantic simulation.” Let us explore this
concept in more depth.

32

Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 49-54.
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Table A: Primary Metaphors33
UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING
Subjective Judgment: Comprehension
Sensorimotor Domain: Object manipulation
Example: “I’ve never been able to grasp
transfinite numbers.”
Primary Experience: Getting information
about an object by grasping and
manipulating it

HAPPY IS UP
Subjective Judgment: Happiness
Sensorimotor Domain: Bodily orientation
Example: “I’m feeling up today.”
Primary Experience: Feeling happy and
energetic and having an upright posture
(correlation between affective state and
posture)

STATES ARE LOCATIONS
Subjective Judgment: A subjective state
Sensorimotor Experience: Being in a
bounded region of space
Example: “I’m close to being in a
depression and the next thing that goes
wrong will send me over the edge.”
Primary Experience: Experiencing a certain
state as correlated with a certain location
(e.g. being cool under a tree, feeling secure
in bed)

KNOWING IS SEEING
Subjective Judgment: Knowledge
Sensorimotor Domain: Vision
Example: “I see what you mean”
Primary Experience: Getting information
through vision
CONTROL IS UP
Subjective Judgment: Being in control
Sensorimotor Domain: Vertical orientation
Example: “Don’t worry! I’m on top of the
situation.”
Primary Experience: Finding that it is easier
to control another person or exert force on
an object from above, where you have
gravity working with you

CHANGE IS MOTION
Subjective Judgement: Experiencing a
change of state
Sensorimotor Domain: Moving
Example: “My car has gone from bad to
worse lately.”
Primary Experience: Experiencing the
change of state that goes with the change of
location as you move

BAD IS STINKY
Subjective Judgement: Evaluation
Sensorimotor Domain: Smell
Example: “This movie stinks.”
Primary Experience: Being repelled by foulsmelling objects (correlation between
evaluative and olfactory experience)

AFFECTION IS WARMTH
Subjective Judgment: Affection
Sensorimotor Domain: Temperature
Example: “They greeted me warmly”
Primary Experience: feeling warm while
being held affectionately

DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS
Subjective Judgment: Difficulty
Sensorimotor Domain: Muscular exertion
Example: “She’s weighed down by
responsibilities.”
Primary Experience: The discomfort or
disabling effect of lifting or carrying heavy
objects

IMPORTANT IS BIG
Subjective Judgment: Importance
Sensorimotor Domain: Size
Example: “Tomorrow is a big day”
Primary Experience: As a child, finding that
big things, e.g. parents, are important and
can exert major forces on you and dominate
your visual experience

Please see Appendix II for an expanded list
of primary metaphors.

These examples of primary metaphors are taken from a table in: Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the
Flesh, 50-54.
33
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Semantic Simulation and the Theory of Embodied Language and Thought:
If You Cannot Imagine It, You Cannot Understand It
Semantic simulation is the term for the cognitive process by which metaphoric
language communicates meaning to the reader/listener. It works by evoking a simulation
of the image and/or action embedded in the metaphor, even when the metaphoric imagery
or action is highly abstract and/or physically impossible (e.g. “grasping” an idea,
“kicking” the habit, “running” late, “throwing” a temper tantrum, etc.). 34 This process,
discovered by cognitive science, is not only the way we understand metaphoric language,
it is also the way we process stories/narratives. In the case of metaphoric language,
imagery, and narrative/stories generally, cognitive scientists tell us: “meaning is mental
simulation.” In other words, if you cannot imagine it, you cannot understand it.35
Semantic simulations work and convey a tremendous amount of meaning because
of the way our brains process imagery, events, and actions. Recent linguistic and
neuroscientific evidence points overwhelmingly to the fact that when reading or hearing
language that includes actions, events, and/or imagery, our mind-brain processes them as
if we were really doing them, seeing them, hearing them, smelling them:
In fact, the evidence suggests that imagery not only activates visual
association areas, but also produces metabolic changes in the primary
visual cortex. The evidence provides a compelling case that imagery uses
many of the same processes critical for perception. The sights in an image

Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. and Teenie Matlock, “Metaphor, Imagination, and Simulation,” in The
Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, ed. Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), 165-166, 173; Gibbs Jr., Embodiment and Cognitive Science, 183-184, 199-201.
34

35

Lakoff, The Neural Theory of Metaphor, 19.
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are likely to activate visual areas of the brain; the sounds, auditory areas;
and the smells, olfactory areas. 36
and:
Many of the neural circuits used in moving are also used in perceiving
motion...imagine you are told a story about someone else kicking. Recent
biological evidence suggests that you can understand such stories by
imagining yourself kicking (Hauk et al. 2004; Tettamanti et al.
2005)...More generally, we can say the following: Understanding language
about perceiving and moving involves much of the same neural circuitry
as do perceiving and moving themselves.37
Since our brain processes imagery and actions as if they were real, imagery and
actions in language (text or spoken) literally evoke similar sensorimotor imagery, actions,
emotions, and sensorimotor stimuli in the mind-brain of the listener/reader. Through this
process the reader/listener’s mind-brain is able to infer a tremendous amount of meaning
on multiple levels (descriptive, emotional, sensorimotor, etc.) from just one image,
action, or metaphor that would take paragraphs of purely descriptive language to spell
out.
Stated simply, the process of language creation and comprehension works like
this: our mind-brain creates language laden with sensorimotor qualities (imagery) and/or

Michael S. Gazzaniga, Richard B. Ivry, and George R. Mangun, Cognitive Neuroscience: The Biology of
the Mind (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 195.
36

Feldman, From Molecule to Metaphor, 4-5. The renowned cognitive linguist, George Lakoff, makes this
same point in his discussion of the Neural Theory of Language, and the psychologists Raymond W. Gibbs,
Jr. and Teenie Matlock devote an entire article to further explicating this phenomenon and its radical
implications for our understanding of literary imagery and metaphor in the new Cambridge Handbook of
Metaphor and Thought (2008) [Lakoff, The Neural Theory of Metaphor, 18-19; Gibbs, Jr. and Matlock,
"Metaphor, Imagination, and Simulation, 161-176]. The theory of semantic simulation received a
tremendous boast recently from a brand new study that used advanced functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) on study participants who read stories while connected to fMRI machines. The researchers
discovered through the fMRI data that when the participants read a story, they created situational
simulations matching the situations in the story by drawing on their sensorimotor faculties [Nicole K.
Spears, Jeremy R. Reynolds, Khena M. Swallow, and Jeffrey M. Zacks, "Reading Stories Activates Neural
Representations of Visual and Motor Experiences," Physchological Science 20, no. 8 (2009): 989-999].
37
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actions (metaphoric or literal), which prompt the audience’s mind-brains to semantically
simulate them, and through this process assign meaning to them in accordance with their
previous sensorimotor experiences and cultural conditioning.
This leads us to one of the foundational premises of cognitive science: human
language/thought and embodied experience (i.e. sensorimotor experience) are
inseparable. We simply could not create nor understand much of human language without
semantic simulation and our lived sensorimotor (i.e. embodied) experiences that this
cognitive process depends on for actualization and realization. This means that the
foundation of human language is not a set of abitrary signs as Saussurean linguistics and
its intellectual descendents have claimed; rather, it is based on and restricted by our
embodied experiences.38

The Cognitive Unconscious
These complex semantic simulations, as well as a dizzying array of other
cognitive processes necessary for the comprehension of even the most basic linguistic
communication, all take place in fractions of a second in what cognitive scientists have
termed, the “cognitive unconscious.”39 According to Lakoff, here is a snapshot of just a
few of the cognitive processes that are occurring every second as you process language:

Gibbs, Jr., Embodiment and Cognitive Science, 8, 276; Feldman, From Molecule to Metaphor, 259;
Gibbs, Jr. and Matlock, Metaphor, Imagination, and Simulation, 164. Information regarding relation to
Saussurean linguistics: Crane and Richardson, Literary Studies and Cognitive Science, 127-128.
38

The “cognitive unconscious” of cognitive science should not be confused with the Freudian idea of the
human subconscious/unconscious and its attendant theories of suppression, dreams, etc. Lakoff and
Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 10-11.
39
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• Differentiating a stream of sounds; recognizing it as language; dividing
it into phonetic segments; identifying phonemes and grouping them into
morphemes.
• Recognizing words and assigning them meaning according the larger
context.
• Retrieving memories relevant to what is said.
• Recalling relevant cognitive frames.
• Constructing mental images and semantic simulations when prompted
and inspecting them.
• Observing and interpreting intonation or body language (if in person), or
tone (if text-based).
• Performing conceptual blending for novel images and/or metaphors.
• Accessing relevant knowledge and cultural norms about concepts,
events, people, etc. that are mentioned.40
While you may be actively aware that you are comprehending a stream of words,
these unconscious cognitive processes (and many, many more!) are all occurring
continuously and simultaneously as a conversation, story, poem, etc. unfolds,
constructing meaning in every instant. Gilles Fauconnier has called this “backstage
cognition” because these processes are neither controllable nor even accessible to the
conscious mind.41 Cognitive scientists estimate, in fact, that at least ninety-five percent of
all thought takes place like this, exclusively in the cognitive unconscious, out of sight and
out of our control.42

Summary of Cognitive Insights
When we read a text or hear a sentence we almost instantaneously “understand”
its meaning, which leads us naturally to locate meaning in the words and their
This list of cognitive processes was adopted nearly wholesale from: Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in
the Flesh, 10-11. However, I have made a few additions and subtractions of my own as well.
40

41

Fauconnier, Methods and Generalizations, 96-99; Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 10-13.

42

Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 10-13.
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grammatical arrangement. However, this is a misconception. Words and grammar can
only “prompt” meaning creation in the mind of the reader, which is carried out (almost
exclusively) by the complex “backstage” cognitive processes of the reader/listener.43
The reason language is successful in communicating such an extraordinary
amount of information with relatively few words is because it prompts our mind-brains
and their universal human faculties (e.g. sensorimotor regions, memory, frames,
conceptual blending) to construct meaning, in accordance with our cultural and
environmental particularities and embodied experiences. Our mind-brain, thought, and
language are all integrally linked with our lived experience and we can neither produce
nor comprehend language and meaning without our sensorimotor experiences.44
This leads to a radical conclusion: the human mind is embodied—there is no
mind-body dualism. Language, thought, and our embodied sensorimotor experience are
inseparable. Descartes was wrong, as the celebrated cognitive neuroscientist Antonio R.
Damasio has said.45 This has very important implications for the cognitive understanding
of language, texts, and meaning, to which I will turn in the next chapter.

43

Fauconnier, Methods and Generalizations, 98-99.

Feldman, From Molecule to Metaphor, 259; Fauconnier, Methods and Generalizations, 98-99; Gibbs, Jr.,
Embodiment and Cognitive Science, 8, 276; Gibbs, Jr. and Matlock, Metaphor, Imagination, and
Simulation, 164.
44

See his fascinating book: Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human
Brain (New York: HarperCollins-Quill), 1994.
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Getting Specific:
A Case Study on Language and Human Emotions
In this chapter, we will see how the basic principles of the cognitive theory of
language (explicated above) work when applied to a specific problem in linguistics (in
this case: how does language express emotion and why do we have emotional reactions to
stories, poems, songs, etc.?). I will also introduce the reader to several cognitive insights
on language and emotions, which are important for my later analysis of Rūmī’s poem on
love—perhaps the most difficult of all human emotions to articulate!

How would you describe love?
Human emotions/feelings are notoriously hard to articulate.46 The depth and
complexity of the feeling(s) that one experiences when meeting the love of one’s life,
seeing one’s first child born, and/or experiencing the death of a loved one, go beyond the
purely literal and descriptive power of even the most accomplished writers. If you were
asked what it feels like to fall madly in love with someone, what would you say? You
would not, most probably, give a literal, point-by-point, detailed description of the intense
emotional high that you felt when you were with your new lover as if, for example, you
were describing to a university colleague what transpired at the last faculty meeting. You

Cognitive scientists make a distinction between “emotions” and “feelings.” Emotions, as defined by
Damasio, are a “collection of body state and brain state changes connected to particular mental images
whose evaluation activated a specific brain system” and “the term feeling should be reserved for the
private, mental experience of an emotion [emphasis added]” [see, Antonio R. Damasio, "Reflections on the
Neurobiology of Emotion and Feeling,” in The Foundations of Cognitive Science, ed. João Branquinho,
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2001), 102-103 and Antonio R. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens:
Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999), 42]. This distinction
is not pertinent to the discussion in this paper, therefore the terms “emotion” and “feeling” are used
interchangeable here.
46
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almost certainly would resort to metaphoric expressions that in some way approximate
the “feeling” of love that pervaded your whole being in those special moments.47 For
example:
Waves of passion engulfed me.
I was swept off my feet.
I felt like I was flying.48
But, why is this? Why must we turn to metaphoric expressions? Why are human
emotional experiences like love so much more difficult to articulate than other human
experiences, such as attending faculty meetings, having the flu, or driving a car? Why are
we not able to literally describe what they feel like? Further, why have psychologists
observed that the more “intense” we perceive a feeling to be, the more likely we are to
use metaphoric language to express it?49
One of the primary reasons emotions are so difficult to express linguistically is
that human feelings/emotions are complex mental states that have a “diffuse structure”
and involve our sensorimotor apparatus, while the words we use to describe them with
are necessarily compact, “differentiated” conceptual categories.50 This problem has a
neurological basis too: emotions are primarily processed by the right hemisphere of the

Zoltán Kövecses, “Metaphor and Emotion,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, ed.
Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 380; Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., The
Poetics of the Mind: Figurative Thought, Language, and Understanding (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1994), 124-127.
47
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Examples one and two here have been adapted from examples in: Gibbs, Jr., The Poetics of the Mind,
148.
49

Gibbs, Jr., The Poetics of the Mind,126.
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Reuven Tsur, "Aspects of Cognitive Linguistics," in Cognitive Stylistics: Language and Cognition in Text
Analysis, ed. Elena Semino and Jonathan Culpeper (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company,
2002), 280-282.
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brain, while the left hemisphere dominates the processing and production of language.51
This enables us to categorically (i.e. linguistically) identify and conceptualize the
emotions/feelings that we feel (i.e. happiness, sadness, love, hate, etc.); however, we
struggle when pressed to literally describe their complex and diffuse character.52
There is, however, a way to overcome this seemingly biologically determined
impasse. Literary scholars and cognitive scientists alike have observed that the most
effective way to communicate emotional qualities in literature is through the use of
evocative imagery that literally induces or evokes the intended emotional state in the
reader.53 In other words, the author must choose imagery that helps the reader experience
the emotion himself/herself by presenting them with imagery that in some way
structurally or affectively semantically simulates the emotion that the author desires to

51

On emotion: Antonio R. Damasio, Ralph Adolphs, and Hanna Damasio, "The Contributions of Legion
Method to the Functional Neuroanatomy of Emotion," in Handbook of Affective Sciences, ed. Richard J.
Davidson Klaus R. Scherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 73. On
language: Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun, Cognitive Neuroscience, 333-335, 340, 342. I do not mean to
assert that these hemispheric distinctions are absolute, which is why I use the word “primarily.” The
traditional dichotomous view held that the left hemisphere was strictly analytical-verbal while the right
hemisphere was strictly holistic-spatial. However, the new view is slightly more nuanced. Gazzaniga, Ivry,
and Mangun caution us to look at the hemispheric distinction as more one of a difference of “general
processing style.” They also remind us that rarely (if ever) is a given stimulus able to be processed
exclusively by one hemisphere of the brain. Normally the hemispheres work together, although they do
process different parts of the given stimulus (344-345).
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Tsur, Aspects of Cognitive Linguistics, 285; Gibbs, Jr., The Poetics of the Mind, 124-126. Although Keith
Oatley’s point it not quite the same as Tsur’s assertion paraphrased above, he also notes that the relation
between the experience of feeling an emotion and the verbal concept of that emotion is different than the
relation between something that has an “external referent like a chair” and its verbal concept [Keith Oatley,
Best Laid Schemes: The Psychology of Emotions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 77-78].
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Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr, John S. Legitt, and Elizabeth A. Turner, "What's special About figurative
Language in emotional Communication" in The Verbal Communication of Emotions, ed. Susan R. Fussell.
Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002), 125-126, 130, 139; Reuven Tsur, Aspects of Cognitive
Linguistics, 286-287; Fatemeh Keshavarz and Habibollah Ghassemzadeh, "Life as a Stream and the
Psychology of "Moment" in Hafiz's Verse: Application of Blending Theory," Journal of Pragmatics 40
(2008), 1782.
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communicate to the reader.54 In this way the reader feels the emotion because of the
“emotional atmosphere” embedded in the poem’s imagery.55 But, how does this work?
Can poetic imagery really induce emotions in a reader? The answer, according to
cognitive science, is ‘yes.’ Poetic imagery can and does induce emotions in the reader
because of the way our brain processes imagery—i.e. semantic simulation.
Damasio argues that “virtually every image, actually perceived or recalled, is
accompanied by some reaction from the apparatus of emotion.”56 This would seem to
follow logically from what Gazzaniga, Lakoff, Feldman, Gibbs, Jr., and Speer have
observed in regards to imagery and the way the human mind processes it in an “as if it
were real” manner.
In light of these recent insights, the difference between vapid and dynamic poetic
imagery is like the difference between the experience of walking into a dimly lit, lifeless,
stale, and abandoned tool shed and the experience of stepping into your family’s home on

When I use the term “structural” I am referring to the diffuse and complex nature of human emotional
states as opposed to the highly differentiated and reified conceptual categories necessarily created by the
mind to identify the collections of various mental and physical changes that they affect in the mind and
body. When I use the term “affective” I am referring to the “feelings” or “emotions” that we normally
associate with different imagery. Here I am drawing on the work of Gibbs, Tsur, and Oatley cited above in
note 51.
54
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Tsur, Aspects of Cognitive Linguistics, 285, 287.

Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, 58. Keith Oatley makes a similar point in regards to fictional
stories. He discusses how we project ourselves into stories and begin to experience emotion based on the
character we identify with. Most people, if they are interested at all in the movie, will experience sadness
when a beloved character dies. Oatley’s point is that while the stories may be fictional (and we know they
are!), the emotions that are induced in us are very real [Keith Oatley, "Creative Expression and
Communication of Emotions in the Visual and Narrative Arts," in Handbook of Affective Sciences, ed.
Richard J. Davidson, Klaus R. Scherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003),
498-499]. It is also important to note that you do not have to be actively conscious that a particular image is
affecting you emotional in order for it to actually do so, as Damasio states: “We do not need to be conscious
of the inducer of an emotion and often are not..The actual cause may have been the image of an event, an
image that had the potential to be conscious but just was not because you did not attend to it while you
where attending to another...In other words, the representations which induce emotions and lead to
subsequent feelings need not be attended, regardless of whether they signify something external to the
organism or something recalled internally” [Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, 47-48].
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Thanksgiving Day, with all the accompanying smells, colors, screaming kids, loving
relatives, and attendant emotions. Just imagine the difference between your sensorimotor
and emotion reactions to these two scenes and you will understand why the quality of
imagery and metaphoric language is so central in effectively communicating meaning and
in the quality of the text/speech generally. We use imagery and metaphoric language to
express emotions linguistically not for rhetorical flourish but for a very practical reason:
namely, complex emotional experiences/feelings cannot be literally described in an
effective manner. They must be evoked in the reader/listener through dynamic imagery.

Imagery, Imagination, and Cognitive Processing
This discussion of imagery and emotions/feelings is not a point to be passed over
lightly. The inducement of different emotional states can dramatically alter the way our
brain processes information (including, poetry). When a new emotional state is induced,
the hypothalamus, basal forebrain, and brain stem release hormones (such as cortisol),
peptides (such as B-endorphin, oxytocin, etc.), and neurotransmitters (such as
monoamines, norepinephrine, serotonin, dopamine, etc.), and in the process, “temporarily
transform the mode of working for many neural circuits,” which fundamentally changes
our “mode of cognitive processing.”57 For example, Joseph P. Forgas cites a number of
studies that indicate that “Happy people [i.e. those in a temporary emotional state of
“happiness”] are more likely to adopt more creative, open, and inclusive thinking styles,
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Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, 60, 80, 282.
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use broader categories, and show greater mental flexibility...”.58 As you can imagine, this
(or the inverse) will significantly affect the way we read and interpret a text and the
openness we have to its many potential meanings.
A similar, and equally important, effect of our “imaginative mind” has been
demonstrated in another recent study where researchers observed that imagining oneself
doing different actions (such as, assuming a different posture, which is what they had
their study participants do) can actually significantly change how we process information.
This research, the study’s authors claim, points to the fact that “imagination has the
extraordinary capacity to shape reality.”59
This understanding of the way our brain processes imagery has profound
implications for the field of literary studies. When considered in the aggregate, all of this
points to the fact that we must take imagery very seriously, not only for its lyrical beauty,
but also for its central role in communicating meaning at the cognitive level and its
ability to cognitively affect the way a reader processes a poem or a story.

Joseph P. Forgas, "Affective Influences on Attitudes and Judgments," in Handbook of Affective Sciences,
ed. Richard J. Davidson, Klaus R. Scherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith (New York: Oxford University Press,
2003), 601.
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Christopher C. Davoli and Richard A. Abrams, "Reaching Out with the Imagination," Psychological
Science 20, no. 3 (2009): 293-295.
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CHAPTER II

Cognitive Science(s) and Literary Studies
New Insights into the Old Questions of Literary Studies

Before we proceed to discuss Rūmī’s poetry, it is important to discuss how the
insights of cognitive science have impacted the traditional understandings of literary
studies in the areas most relevant to the present study: specifically, language, texts,
literary imagery, and meaning. Our view of the interrelation of these basic elements of
communication is essential for our larger understanding of literature from the role of
literary tropes to the process of translation.

Language, Texts, and Meaning
The cognitive insights into the nature of language, thought, and the human mindbrain have had a very important effect on the way language, texts, and meaning are
conceptualized in cognitive studies:
Cognitive linguistics recognizes that the study of language is the study of
language use...Language does not "represent" meaning; it prompts for the
construction of meaning in particular contexts with particular cultural models and
cognitive resources. Very sparse grammar guides us along the same rich mental
paths, by prompting us to perform complex cognitive operations. Thus, a large
part of cognitive linguistics centers on the creative on-line construction of
meaning as discourse unfolds in context. The dividing line between semantics and
pragmatics dissolves and truth-conditional compositionality disappears.60
60

Fauconnier, Cognitive Science, 539-540.
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This approach to language redefines the nature of texts altogether—no longer is a
text simply a repository of static meaning that can be extracted by the keen scholarly eye
and catalogued as a philological artifact. On the contrary, a text is a re-occuring
performance that is a catalyst for “creative on-line creation of meaning” for every new
audience member. Each constituent element of language and texts—grammar, structure,
prosody, metaphor, imagery, image schemas, etc.—become the individual actors in this
performance, each with a unique role to play in the larger production and each worthy of
closer examination for the particular role they play in “prompting” meaning creation in
the reader’s mind. Scott Delancey summarizes this position pithly: “In its communicative
function, language is a set of tools with which we attempt to guide another mind to create
within itself a mental representation that approximates one we have.”61
Meaning, therefore, according to cognitivists, is “emergent” and interactive—i.e.
not fixed or catalogable. It is located in the reader’s mind, subjectively defined by the
complex intersections of their previous knowledge, associations, memories, and emotions
evoked by the text and its constituent parts.62 This understanding of language, texts, and
meaning shifts the focus from the texts and their supposedly stable and inherent meaning,
and focuses instead on the reader and their “creative on-line construction of meaning.”
This shift in perspective, amongst other things, necesitates new approaches to the
different elements of language and texts, literary tropes, and translation.

Quoted in: Feldman, From Molecule to Metaphor, 259. Although Delancey uses the phrase
“create...mental representation[s]” above, it is actually more accurate, cognitively-speaking, to say “evoke
mental simulations.” This latter terminology is considered the dominant view in cognitive science.
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Herbert Simon, "Literary Criticism: A Cognitive Approach," Stanford Humanities Review 4, no. 1
(1995); Fauconnier, Methods and Generalizations, 98-100, 123-124.
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Literary Imagery
If the primary role of language is to evoke mental simulations in the mind of the
reader that in some way correspond to the experience the writer is trying to articulate,
then literary imagery becomes one of the most important tools (if not the most important
tool) at the disposal of the writer. Indeed, since the cognitive view of language maintains
that most of language is predicated on metaphor, it is not a stretch to say that literary
imagery may be the most significant purveyor of meaning in all of language.
The study of metaphoric imagery in literature and poetry is, of course, nothing
new or revolutionary. Literary scholars have long considered the quality and dynamism
of a literary work’s imagery to be an important part of its broader aesthetic appeal. What
cognitive science has revealed, however, is why the nature of the imagery in a work is so
important. Imagery, according to cognitive science, is not important so much for what it
“represents,” but, rather, for what it cognitively evokes in the reader.
In the scholarship on Rūmī’s works, too often his dynamic imagery is treated
simply as representations of this or that Sufi idea, as Fatemeh Keshavarz has noted in her
recent study of Rūmī’s poetry.63 The standard accounts of Rūmī’s poetic imagery usually
go something like this: wine represents the intoxication of love that the sufis experience
in their union with the Beloved (God); fire represents the intense passion of the lovers;
the ocean represents God and God’s infiniteness; etc. The problem with philological
catalogues of imagery like this is not that they are inherently incorrect; rather, their fault
lies in that they completely ignore the important role that imagery plays in
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Keshavarz, Reading Mystical Lyric, 72-77.
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communicating meaning to the reader.64 Studies like this are so concerned with finding
the pure and immutable meaning of each piece of imagery that they ignore its
performative aspects. 65
Their “referential” or “representational” approach is anathema to the cognitive
understanding of imagery because it both fundamentally misinterprets the purpose of
poetic imagery and fails to consider how our minds process imagery. As discussed in the
preceding sections, authors employ metaphoric imagery to express experiences, thoughts,
feelings, etc. that go beyond the descriptive power of purely discursive language. They
utilize imagery, therefore, not to “refer to” or “represent” something, but, rather, to evoke
meaning creation through semantic simulations and to induce emotive and sensual
atmosphere(s) in the mind-brain of the reader, which, together, communicate far more
meaning than would be possible by purely representational discursive language.
In cognitive science, imagery is a catalyst that catapults the reader beyond the
limitations of literal and purely descriptive language and into an emergent world (termed,
a “mental space”) that is formed through a dialectic between the cognitive unconscious of
the reader and the textual “prompts” provided by the imagery, grammar, and imageschemas of the text.66 Here, in this emergent world, the reader experiences the imagery
themselves in the same (or at least similar) way as if they were really seeing it or doing it,
There are times however, when they are incorrect, as Keshavarz points out in her study. She notes that in
many critical works on the Divan-i Shams the authors try to “reach a single fixed interpretation for each
image” which “reduces them to a conventional hard core” (Keshavarz, Reading Mystical Lyric, 72).
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Keshavarz makes this point in her trenchant study of Rūmī’s lyrics: Keshavarz, Reading Mystical Lyric,
72-77. Her study is a notable exception to this general trend.
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Keshavarz uses the concept of “emergent world” in her fascinating study on ‘Attar’s Mantiq al-Tayr:
Fatemeh Keshavarz, "Flight of the Birds: The Poetic Animating the Spiritual in 'Attar's 'Mantiq al-Tayr'," in
'Attar and the Persian Sufi Tradition: The Art of Spiritual Flight, edited by Leonard Lewisohm and
Christopher Shackle (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 116, 129.
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and, through this complex cognitive simulation that occurs in a fraction of a second (and
usually unconsciously), the reader is able to assign meaning to it. 67 This is the purpose of
poetic imagery and this is where the meaning of poetic imagery is generated—not in
dusty dictionaries nor the annals of philologists. The meaning of imagery is not in the
words, it is in the dynamic mental simulations that they evoke in the reader. This is an
essential point for all literary scholars to keep in mind while analyzing and translating
literature (a topic which I will return to in the next chapter).

The ‘Meaning Event’
The cognitive view of language, texts, imagery, and meaning discussed in the last
two sections corresponds closely with the concept of mystical writings as “meaning
events,” a concept which has been elaborated previously by Sells, Keshavarz and Tsur.
They have all demonstrated in their studies of mystical literature of Greek/Christian/
Islamic/Jewish/Secular-Mystical origin that mystical texts often semantically enact (i.e.
as opposed to literally describe) the mystical experience/meaning they are seeking to
communicate.68 Sells has termed this phenomenon the “meaning event”:
Meaning event indicates that moment when the meaning has become
identical or fused with the act of predication. In metaphysical terms,
essence is identical with existence, but such identity is not only asserted, it
is performed...It is the semantic analogue to the experience of mystical
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Michael A. Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994); Keshavarz,
Reading Mystical Lyric; Keshavarz, Flight of the Birds; Tsur, Aspects of Cognitive Linguistics; and Reuven
Tsur, On the Shores of Nothingness: Space, Rhythm, an Semantic Structure in Religious Poetry and its
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union. It does not describe or refer to mystical union but effects a semantic
union that re-creates or imitates the mystical union. 69
Tsur makes a similar point, but he characterizes it as the difference between
“telling” and “showing” meaning, and explicitly links it to the cognitive aspects of
understanding meaning in poetry. 70 Keshavarz, in her recent study of Rūmī’s poetics,
cites Sells approvingly and argues that we must “observe the poems in action” to fully
comprehend the dynamic ways in which Rūmī creates meaning because he expresses
meaning “not through description and explication but by letting the reader share [the]
experience in his/her role as the reader of [the] lyrics.”71
The similarity between the cognitive perspective on language and meaning and
the concept of the “meaning event” as elucidated by Sells, Keshavarz and Tsur is quite
striking. In fact, in essence, they are almost identical. The important point in both the
studies of the cognitive scientists and these innovative literary scholars is that language
communicates meaning not simply by referring to something, but rather, by semantically
enacting it, or evoking it, for the reader. Cognitive science may, however, aid in
expanding the concept of the “meaning event” and help corroborate its basic premises by
answering the fundamental question: how does language do this? how does language
create “a semantic union that re-creates or imitates the mystical union,” as Sells suggests?
As we saw in the last chapter, our ability to both formulate and comprehend
language is directly tied to our embodied experiences and sensorimotor regions of our
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brain. It logically follows that mystical experience and mystical language are in some
sense inseparable. When mystics discuss their mystical experience, they will inevitably
draw on the sensorimotor experiences they felt during their mystical experience and
choose metaphoric language/imagery that in some way communicates these same
sensorimotor experiences to the reader. The reader then reads the mystical writing, which
evokes similar mental simulations and their attendant sensorimotor sensations and
emotional responses within their own mind.72 In some sense then, the reader too is able to
experience aspects of the mystical experience of the author.
When considered in this view, all images, metaphors, etc. become meaning events
because each (in their own limited way) are a moment of fusion between the mystical
experience, its meaning, and its predication. In these moments, meaning is not only
asserted or performed, it is also experienced in a very real way by the reader through the
cognitive process of semantic simulation.

These mental simulations and their attendant sensorimotor sensations and emotional responses are all, of
course, limited by the conceptual frameworks and experiential history that the individual reader possesses.
72

36

CHAPTER III

Rūmī’s Ghazal #1919
A Literary Analysis and a New Translation

It should come as little surprise that this poem has been very popular with Rūmī
scholars and translators. Although no scholarly work has been done on it specifically, it
has appeared in all three of the major English translations of Rūmī’s poetry from his
Dīvān-i Shams. Its dynamic and interlocking imagery leaves a powerful impression in the
mind of the reader.
After reviewing the previous translations of this poem, I decided to provide the
reader with a new one.73 This was necessary because, as I will argue in the next chapter,
the old translations by Nicholson, Arberry, and Schimmel simply fail to capture the magic
of Rūmī’s original Persian verses. While no translation may be able to do justice to this
ghazal, I hope mine captures better some of the dynamic imagery and word plays that are
clearly present in the original.

On Translating Mystical Lyrics:
The Meaning Event and Cogno-Erotic Translation
In translating mystical poetry, particular care must be taken to translate not only
the literally meaning, but also the “meaning events” and their cognitive features (imagery,
73

The full translations by Nicholson, Arberry, and Schimmel can be found in Appendix I.
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metaphor, image schemas, structure, etc.) that are interwoven into the linguistic fabric of
the poem. The awareness of these “meaning events” and their centrality in
communicating the meaning of the mystical texts necessitates new approaches to
translation as an academic enterprise. It demands, above all, that we reject the view of
translation as a mechanical act of substituting “arbitrary signs” that “represent” or “refer”
to the same objects or actions according to our trusty multilingual dictionaries and
philological catalogues of metaphor and imagery. Indeed, it is imperative—particularly in
our rapidly globalizing world—that translation advance beyond the “substitution method”
derived from the Saussurean understanding of linguistics.
The literary scholar and translator, Gayatri Spivak, has made a similar plea for a
fundamental reorientation in our approach to translation. She argues for what she calls an
“erotic” approach to translation, which requires the translator to “surrender themselves to
the text” and “intimately” engage it, in order to go beyond the superficial level of words
and their syntactical structures.74 Her argument (and mine) is not that meticulous
attention to the linguistical and syntactical details in the texts we are translating is
unimportant. Rather, her point, and mine in my cognitive approach here, is that
“meaning” goes beyond words and their structure. Just as the language of lovers
(mystical or mundane)—the language of the heart—goes beyond words, so too must we
as translators go beyond the surface level of what words “mean” or “represent,” and feel
how they speak to our hearts (or, mind-brains).

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "The Politics of Translation," in Outside in the Teaching Machine, ed.
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 179-200 (New York: Routledge, 1993): 180-183.
74
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This “erotic” approach to translation fits very well, I believe, with the cognitive
approach to translation, which also insists that we look beyond what words “represent” to
see how they literally feel to us. Far from being just pedantic literary theory, cognitive
science tells us that this is quite literally how our mind-brain processes language and
texts.
If there is any hope for a true translation of Rūmī’s poetry, I believe we, as
translators, must surrender ourselves to our texts and go beyond their words by intimately
engaging them at one of the “hundred thousand” levels of the heart, or in modern
parlance, at one of the “hundred thousand” cognitive levels of the human mind-brain.75
This requires a “cogno-erotic translation.” Perhaps this is what Rūmī meant when he said:
Without considering the words of this poem see in the heart what it means! 76
To the extent that this is possible, this is my overriding modus operandi in my own
translation here.77
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This is the author’s translation. Persian text from: Forouzanfar Collection Ghazal #1077; Nicholson
Collection Ghazal #XXVI.
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Translation
1
2
3

4
5

6
7

Love is flying in the sky
every breath tearing a hundred veils
the first breath, renouncing self
the last step, renouncing feet
being indifferent to this world
even not seeing what one’s own eyes see!
I said: heart be blessed
upon being received in the circle of lovers
seeing farther than the eye
running in the alleys of the bosom.
O Soul! from where came this breath?
O Heart! from where is this beating?
O Bird! speak the language of the birds!
I know how to hear your secret.

8 The Heart said: I was occupied with the work of the house
baking the house of water and clay
9 from the house of creation I was flying
so to create the house of creation.
10 When foot remained not, they were pulling me
how can I say how they were pulling?!?!

ﻋﺸﻖ ﺍﺳﺖ ﺩﺭ ﺁﺳﻤﺎﻥ ﭘﺮﯾﺪﻥ
ﺻﺪ ﭘﺮﺩﻩ ﺑﻪ ﻫﺮ ﻧﻔﺲ ﺩﺭﯾﺪﻥ
ﺍﻭﻝ ﻧﻔﺲ ﺍﺯ ﻧﻔﺲ ﮔﺴﺴﱳ
ﺁﺧﺮ ﻗﺪﻡ ﺍﺯ ﻗﺪﻡ ﺑﺮﯾﺪﻥ
ﻧﺎﺩﯾﺪﻩ ﮔﺮﻓﱳ ﺍﯾﻦ ﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﺭﺍ
ﻣﺮ ﺩﯾﺪﻩ ﺧﻮﯾﺶ ﺭﺍ ﻧﺪﯾﺪﻥ
ﺖ ﺑﺎﺩIﻪ ﺩﻻ ﻣﺒﺎﺭI ﮔﻔﺘﻢ
ﺩﺭ ﺣﻠﻘﻪ ﻋﺎﺷﻘﺎﻥ ﺭﺳﯿﺪﻥ
ﺮﺩﻥI ﺯ ﺁﻥ ﺳﻮﯼ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻧﻈﺎﺭﻩ
ﻮﭼﻪ ﺳﯿﻨﻪ ﻫﺎ ﺩﻭﯾﺪﻥI ﺩﺭ
ﺠﺎ ﺭﺳﯿﺪﺕ ﺍﯾﻦ ﺩﻡI ﺍﯼ ﺟﺎﻥ ﺯ
ﺠﺎﺳﺖ ﺍﯾﻦ ﻃﭙﯿﺪﻥI ﺍﯼ ﺩﻝ ﺯ
ﺍﯼ ﻣﺮﻍ ﺑﮕﻮ ﺯﺑﺎﻥ ﻣﺮﻏﺎﻥ
ﻣﻦ ﺩﺍﱎ ﺭﻣﺰ ﺗﻮ ﺷﻨﯿﺪﻥ
ﺎﺭ ﺧﺎﻧﻪ ﺑﻮﺩﻡI ﺩﻝ ﮔﻔﺖ ﺑﻪ
ﺗﺎ ﺧﺎﻧﻪ ﺁﺏ ﻭ ﮔﻞ ﭘﺰﯾﺪﻥ
ﺍﺯ ﺧﺎﻧﻪ ﺻﻨﻊ ﻣﯽ ﭘﺮﯾﺪﻡ
ﺗﺎ ﺧﺎﻧﻪ ﺻﻨﻊ ﺁﻓﺮﯾﺪﻥ
ﺸﯿﺪﻧﺪI ﭼﻮﻥ ﭘﺎﯼ ﳕﺎﻧﺪ ﻣﯽ
ﺸﯿﺪﻥI ﭼﻮﻥ ﮔﻮﯾﻢ ﺻﻮﺭﺗﯽ

A Literary Analysis
This poem starts in the air—for love (‘eshq) is not grounded, it is exhilarating and
unbound by earthly rules, distinctions, boundaries, etc. Immediately we, as readers, are
flying with love from our earthly existence into the sky (āsemān) (line one). The sky is
the known, unknown—the domain we can always see but cannot reach under normal
human conditions—at least, according to the laws of “the house of creation” (khāne-ye
son’) (line nine). You cannot get there on foot, nor if you cling to your (lower) self (nafs)
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and this world (line two). The sky is the domain of the morq—the mystical bird who
speaks only the language of the heart (line seven). It is where the “house of creation” is
created and it is also the poetic environment that Rūmī chose for his poetic creation on
love (line nine).
Rūmī tells us that we too can fly with love in the unbounded expanses of the sky
and join the circle of lovers (line four)! However, we must take the first step—in fact, we
must jump and put ourselves at the complete mercy of the overwhelming force called
love. If we are scared to leave our feet or lose ourself (nafs) (line two), we will instead
cling like a frightened child to this world of “water and clay” (line three and eight).
However, if we throw ourselves with complete reckless abandonment towards the
sky, love will carry us (“pull” us) the rest of the way (line ten). It is only love that can
carry us there, and it is only love that can tear the veils that blind us from seeing “farther
than the eye” and clear our ears so that we may hear and understand the secrets of the
mystical birds (line one, five, and seven).
And what is their secret? What does the “circle of lovers” know that those on the
ground do not? Line nine tell us: somehow, through the mysterious force of love, we too
can participate in the creation of the world (tā khāne-ye son’ āfarīdan).

General Cognitive Observations
While the next chapter will focus specifically on a cognitive analysis of a few
selected parts of this poem, I will begin here with couple of general cognitive
observations about this poem.
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First, it is important to note that while the central character of this poem is love
(‘eshq), it is never described literally, but rather, it is treated only in a series of metaphors
throughout the poem.78 Love is “flying in the sky”(line one); love is “tearing a hundred
veils” (line one); and love is “pulling” (line ten). Notice that these metaphors all are
based on the same primary metaphor (namely, EMOTIONS ARE FORCES) and all derive
their meaning from embodied and sensorimotor experiences (i.e. flying, tearing, and
pulling).79
Love is also treated indirectly using metaphors, in the sense that we are told that
love compels one to do certain things—e.g. to “renounc[e]” our (lower) self (nafs) and to
“[be] indifferent to the world.” While both “renouncing” and “being indifferent” to
something may not seem at first to be related to the EMOTIONS ARE FORCES primary
metaphor, upon closer examination, they in fact are.
Both “renouncing” and “being indifferent” to something requires the force of a
human’s will power to be accomplished. In this sense, human will power is conceived of
metaphorically as a tool that we wield and manipulate (i.e. the embodied sensorimotor
basis of the metaphor) to force our body to do things that we may not do naturally

In the context of Rūmī’s mystical poetry, love can be thought of as both the human emotion and as the
dominant characteristic or feature of union with God.
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The one exception to my observation that all of the metaphors for love are based on the primary
metaphor EMOTIONS ARE FORCES is in the second part of line three (“even not seeing what one’s own
eyes see!”). While one could make a tortured argument for the inclusion of this within the framework of the
EMOTIONS ARE FORCES primary metaphor, arguing for example that you must force yourself to not see
what your eyes see or that you must force yourself to see beyond external appearances, I think it may be
better to avoid such tortured explanations and instead just regard this as an exception that proves the
general rule: namely, emotions are usually conceptualized as forces in human language (see the next
chapter for more on this). The discussion of emotions as forces is based on the work of Zoltán Kövecses.
See: Zoltán Kövecses, Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 57-58, 61, 85, 192 and Kövecses, Metaphor and Emotion (2008),
385. His work will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
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otherwise.80 When considered this way, “love” is the force that leads the lovers to
willfully renounce themselves and be indifferent to the world.
So while “renouncing” ourselves and our feet and “being indifferent to the world”
may not seem to be based on embodied sensorimotor experiences and the primary
metaphor EMOTIONS ARE FORCES at first glance, upon further examination and a bit of
cognitive dissection, we discover that at the most basic levels they very much are. The
point to remember here is not these pedantic details; rather, what is important is the
central metaphoric thread that is running through this entire poem: LOVE IS A FORCE (I
will discuss this further in the next chapter).
The second important point to note here is that there are at least two other even
more basic primary metaphors that together with LOVE IS A FORCE form the foundation
of this poem: namely, STATES ARE LOCATIONS and CHANGE IS MOTION. 81 These two
primary metaphors conceptually blend with the LOVE IS A FORCE metaphor to form the
linguistic framework for the entire poem. Let us look closer at how exactly this works.
Throughout the poem, there are clearly two “locations” which are in opposition to
one another and sharply contrasted with each other. First, there is the sky (or, the air),
which is where love is flying (line one), the circle of lovers is located (line four), the
“house of creation is being created” (line nine), and love is pulling Rūmī (line ten).
Secondly, in opposition, there is the ground, which is never explicitly mentioned but is

Here are a couple more mundane examples, for clarity sake: if someone is fasting, they will use their will
power to force themselves not to eat, or someone really wants to go to a party on Friday night but they have
homework to do, they will (hopefully) use their will power to force themselves to stay home and finish their
work.
80

These two primary metaphors are listed in the table of common primary metaphors in: Lakoff and
Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 52.
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easily inferred by the mention of “feet” in lines two and ten, “this world” (line three), the
“house of water and clay” (line eight), and the “house of creation” (line nine). These two
locations are clearly identified by Rūmī with two different emotional states: namely, the
sky is the domain of love and the ground is the domain of “not-love” (for lack of a better
word).82
Why would Rūmī choose these two locations to be the metaphoric images for the
emotional states of love and not-love? The answer is simply (no tortured Freudian
psychologizing of Rūmī needed!): the everyday human embodied, sensorimotor
experience of walking on the firm ground, with its conspicuous mundanity, evokes
feelings of stability, security, and control (all paramount concerns of the ego and the
lower self, the nafs). Further, the action of walking is a very deliberate and ego-controlled
action, in the sense that normally you, as director of your body, decide and order your
feet where to take you next.
However, in stark contrast to these characteristics of our “grounded” experience,
the embodied, sensorimotor experience of being in the air (whether accidentally falling or
deliberately jumping) is completely the opposite: uncertain, incontrollable, and
simultaneously both exhilarating and frightening. It is precisely because these two
different locations would evoke these two very different sets of sensorimotor experiences
and emotional states in the reader that Rūmī likely chose them.
In short, the metaphoric foundation of this poem looks like this: in order to get
from the ground (location #1) to the sky (location #2) requires a change of state (i.e. from

I am not, of course, suggesting that Rūmī is asserting that earthly love is not true love or anything along
this line. Rather, my point is that he is using this imagery of the sky and the ground for metaphoric effect.
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“not-love” to “love”). Change occurs with motion, which needs a force (here, “love”) to
be actualized. What is the importance of all of this? In sum, what has been discussed in
this section is the metaphoric skeleton of ghazal #1919. It is the framing for the rest of
the poem and the cognitive foundation for its imagery and metaphoric language. Without
these initial building blocks (i.e. these primary metaphors discussed above) our brains
would not be able to comprehend most of the poem because it would be unable to map
the sensorimotor experiences of “flying”, “running”, “pulling”, being in the air (i.e. the
sky), etc. onto the conceptual idea of love. And, to return to a question I asked earlier,
without the ability to map these and other sensorimotor experiences onto the concept of
love, how would you describe love?

The Two Versions of the Original Persian Text:
The Extant Manuscripts and the Printed Editions of the “Dīvān-i Shams”
Before we proceed to delve more deeply into the cognitive analysis of this poem
and some of its translations, I need to say a word about the differences between its two
most prominent printed editions.
This issue cannot be passed over without comment because words and word order
are extremely important in cognitive poetics. A simple preposition, a definite article, or
even a tense shift can dramatically change the way we perceive and process a poem and
the poetic environment that it creates in our mind (as we will see in an example from this
poem discussed in the next chapter). Therefore, any cognitive analysis of a pre-modern
literary work must first begin by taking a serious look at the manuscript evidence. Is there
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more than one version of the work? If there are, what are the differences? How
significant are they for our cognitive understanding of the text? These issues are
particularly acute in the examination of short poems, where individual lines contain few
words and the meanings of their lines, at times, can be playful enigmatic and change
significantly with only the slightest alteration in the text.
The poem under consideration here has at least two printed versions (in Persian),
both of which were prepared by major scholars in the field of Rūmī studies (R.A.
Nicholson and Badi’ al-Zamān Forouzanfar). The differences between the two versions
are not major, but do include a few notable discrepancies:
1. Line 1: dar/in (Nicholson) / bar/on (Forouzanfar)
2. Line 2: ākhar/last (Nicholson) / āvval/first (Forouzanfar)
3. Line 3: nadīdan/not seeing (Nicholson) / bedīdan/seeing (Forouzanfar)
4. Line 6: jān/soul (Nicholson) / del/heart (Forouzanfar)
5. Line 6: resīdan/arriving (Nicholson) / resīd/arrived (Forouzanfar)
6. Line 8: pazīdan/cooking, baking (Nicholson) / parīdan/flying (Forouzanfar)
7. Line 10: sūratī/the way (Nicholson) / sūrat-i/the way (Forouzanfar)
While Forouzanfar’s edition is generally considered to be the standard Persian
text in academic circles, it is not perfect and indeed it is known to have a few problems,
as Rūmī scholar Franklin Lewis notes:
[Forouzanfar’s] edition is not definitive; several spurious poems likely
remain in the text and occasionally Forouzanfar chooses readings that
could be improved upon. A.J. Arberry, for example, collated Forouzanfar’s
edition with the Chester Beatty manuscript (which Forouzanfar had access
to in a microfilm which Arberry had prepared for him) and felt that
Forouzanfar had not fully taken it into consideration.83
I include this caveat not to disparage Forouzanfar’s tremendous work and his
generally superior edition of the Dīvān-i Shams, but rather to explain why I have decided
83

Lewis, Rūmī, 301-303.
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to use Nicholson’s text for ghazal #1919. It is not within the scope of this study to
undertake a comprehensive analysis of the extant manuscript evidence. My preference for
Nicholson’s Persian text of ghazal #1919 is based solely on my literary analysis of the
two versions.84
As I discussed in the last section, the metaphoric frame of this poem is predicated
on the opposition between the domains of the sky and the ground (“love is flying in the
sky,” must “renounce” feet, etc.). One of the differences noted above between
Nicholson’s and Forouzanfar’s text is in line two, where Nicholson chooses the reading
with ākhar (last) and Forouzanfar chooses āvval (first). Since the metaphoric frame of
this poem is about flight (i.e. leaving the earth), I would argue that Nicholson’s reading of
“the last (ākhar) step, renouncing feet” makes more sense here because the “last step”
before you can fly is “renouncing feet.” Imagine for a second that you could fly. If you
were running, and about to take off, what would be the last step before you ascended into
the sky? Precisely, the “last step” would be “renouncing feet” (i.e. leaving the earth).
Thus, I would argue that Nicholson’s reading here of ākhar gadam āz qadam gosastan is
superior to Forouzanfar’s reading of āvval gadam āz qadam gosastan because it fits the
metaphoric frame better.
This, of course, is only a literary argument, and, perhaps, there is manuscript
evidence to the contrary. However, for this and similar literary reasons in the cases of the
other discrepancies in the manuscripts (which I do not have the space to discuss in depth),
I have decided to utilize Nicholson’s text of Rūmī’s original Persian poem.
I hope raising this issue will lead someone with access to the various extant manuscripts and the requisite
expertise in this area to investigate the manuscript evidence further in order to confirm or refute my literary
assessment.
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CHAPTER IV

‘This’ is not ‘Love’
Approaching Ghazal #1919 and its Translations
from a Cogno-Erotic Perspective

The late preeminent scholar of Islamic Studies, Anne Marie Schimmel, recently
edited and translated a short collection of poems from the Dīvān-i Shams of the now
world famous Persian mystical poet Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, entitled Look! This is Love:
Poems of Rūmī (Shambhala, 1996). The title of this collection, containing some of
Rūmī’s most famous poems, is derived from the first line of ghazal #1919, to which
Schimmel gives pride of place as the first poem in her book. This particularly famous
ghazal has also appeared in the two other major collections of Rūmī’s poems translated
and edited by R.A. Nicholson (Selected Poems from the Dīvān-e Shams-e Tabrizi of
Jalāluddīn Rūmī) and A.J. Arberry (Mystical Poems of Rūmī: Poems 201-400).
This chapter will focus specifically on ghazal #1919, examining some of its most
prominent verses with the critical lens of cognitive literary criticism, while also critiquing
how these same verses have been handled by the most recognized translators of Rūmī
(i.e. Nicholson, Arberry, and Schimmel). While at first these two aims may seem
disparate and difficult to reconcile, in reality they have a symbiotic relationship in the
sense that through critiquing the existing translations I will be able to demonstrate both
why cognitive analysis of literature is vitally important for understanding meaning
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creation and also how failing to understand the cognitive dimensions of literature can
lead to some very real problems in translation. As will be demonstrated, understanding
how Rūmī’s original lyrics communicate meaning at the cognitive level is absolutely
essential for translating them correctly.
In this chapter, I will argue that the translations of ghazal #1919 by Nicholson,
Arberry, and Schimmel have failed to capture the dynamic ways in which Rūmī creates
meaning at the cognitive level.85 In the end, the problem with their translations is that
while translating the poem literally correctly, they have destroyed central elements of the
cognitive meaning of the poem, and in the process, the poem has ceased to be a “meaning
event.”

Why ‘This’ Cannot Be ‘Love’
The problems begin with the first word. In the original Persian poem, Rūmī
begins ‘eshq āst dar āsimān parīdan (literally, “Love is in the sky flying”). The first word
here, ‘eshq, is an abstract human emotional state, meaning “love” in English. ‘eshq is not,
despite how it has been rendered into English verse, modified by the demonstrative
adjective this (persian, īn) in the original, nor is it followed by a colon (i.e. as Nicholson
et al. have translated it: “This is love: to fly...”). Cognitively-speaking, the difference for
the English reader is enormous.

I want to state categorically that my intent in this paper is not to disparage the tremendous scholarly
work that all of these scholars did during their lifetime. I enormously respect all of them, and I owe an
enormous intellectual debt to them for my own intellectual understanding of Islam, and specifically Islamic
mysticism. However, I do believe that we must critically assess their work using the newest advancements
in any number of fields, including cognitive approaches to literature. It is only in the spirit of deepest
respect for them that I approach this critique of their work. I do believe that they would be pleased with any
study that advances a more complete understanding of the life and works of Rūmī.
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In the original Persian, Rūmī welcomes us into his poetic environment with the
diffuse and abstract (i.e. non-reified) human emotion of “love,” which would
immediately evoke emotive imagery of waves of warmth, surrender of self, etc. in the
reader’s mind. This is all the more important because it is the first word and, as such, it
sets the “emotional atmosphere” for the rest of the poem. Cognitively speaking, this is no
small matter. The emotional state in which one reads a poem can dramatically change the
way one processes its content (as discussed in chapter I).
It is also significant that Rūmī chooses to begin his poem simply with the word
“love,” because, as Tsur has observed, abstract emotional states are one of the primary
poetic devices for constructing poetic environments in which divisions and boundaries
between defined entities cease to exist [note: in his analysis he includes “emotions” under
the larger category of “abstractions”]:
From the point of view of available verbal techniques... abstractions, gases
and liquids are among the most prototypical natural symbols in our
conceptual system to suggest a state in which the boundaries between
objects are suspended.86
Thus, by placing the abstract quality “love” first, Rūmī immediately creates, and
welcomes us into, a poetic environment that is both affectively characterized by
“love” (and its associated emotive feelings) and structurally characterized by a lack of
divisions and borders. This is meaning that the reader feels, but may not necessarily be
conscious of (see footnote fifty-six on conscious and unconscious induction of emotion).
In this way, Rūmī communicates a tremendous amount of meaning, which, despite its

Quote from: Tsur, On the Shores of Nothingness, 233. Also see the rest of this from more on this topic, as
well as: Reuven Tsur, "'Oceanic' Dedifferentiation and Poetic Metaphor," Journal of Pragmatics 12 (1988):
711-24.
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discrete cognitive nature, is nevertheless clearly present in the first word (‘ishq) of the
original poem.
The overflowing meaning that emanates from the first word of Rūmī’s original
poem is in sharp contrast to the English translations by Nicholson, Arberry, Schimmel
(i.e. “This is love: to fly...”). In their translations, the reader is met with the delimiting
demonstrative adjective “this,” which divides and reifies the warm, inviting, and
boundary-less poetic atmosphere Rūmī has created into a cold, conceptual, and
differentiated environment. Moreover, immediately following the word “love,” the reader
of the translation is also treated to an abrupt punctuation mark, a colon, which is used to
“mark boundaries within a sentence.”87 This further divides and differentiates the flowing
and undifferentiated environment that we enjoy in the original Persian.
Both of these interpretative decisions undermine Rūmī’s dynamic creation of
meaning in the original Persian. Erecting poetic divisions and cognitive barriers belies the
unbounded exhilaration of love (“flying in the sky”) and the union between lovers
(“every breath tearing a hundred veils”) that is the principal concern of this poem. When
the reader is presented with ‘eshq āst (“love is”) in Rūmī’s original poem, s/he constructs
a starkly different poetic environment than when presented with the sharply
differentiating “This is love:” in the English translations. “Love” leads us to commune
with Rūmī’s warm, nurturing, and undifferentiated poetic environment, in the same way
that Rūmī communes with the “circle of lovers” in line four. In fact, we may even feel
like we are “being pulled” into the poem in the same indescribable way that Rūmī
Geoffrey Nunberg, Ted Briscoe, and Rodney Huddleston, “Punctuation,” in The Cambridge Grammar of
the English Language, ed Rodney Huddleston and Geoffrey K. Pullum (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 1735.
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exclaims in the final verse: “how can I say how they were pulling!?!?”. Perhaps this is his
poetic way to invite us into the “circle of lovers”? If so, beginning the translation with
“love” would be far more inviting to the reader than the harsher “This is love: to fly...”.

Cognitive Schemas, Metaphoric Forms, and Oceanic Dedifferentiation
I would like to now turn to another poetic feature in the opening line of Rūmī’s
ghazal we are exploring, namely his use of the IMMERSION IN ABSTRACTION metaphor
form (i.e. “Love is flying IN the sky”). Tsur has observed in a number of studies that
poets frequently use metaphors of the IMMERSION IN ABSTRACTION form when
writing about their emotional high points of mystical or romantic union.88 He suggests
that metaphors of this form are particularly felicitous for communicating the intense
feelings of “peak experiences” because they cognitively evoke a sense of “oceanic
dedifferentiation” in the reader, where boundaries and distinctions between differentiated
objects cease to exist.89 The level of “oceanic dedifferentiation” may vary according to
the exact imagery used; however, at the very least, metaphors of this type create a poetic
environment that is perceived by the reader as less differentiated.90 He bases this on the
same principle quoted above, namely:
From the point of view of available verbal techniques... abstractions, gases
and liquids are among the most prototypical natural symbols in our

Tsur, 'Oceanic' Dedifferentiation and Poetic Metaphor, 711, 718-719; Tsur, On the Shores of
Nothingness, 234. The first example is taken from: Tsur, 'Oceanic' Dedifferentiation and Poetic Metaphor,
716.
88

89

Tsur, On the Shores of Nothingness, 233-234.

90

Tsur, 'Oceanic' Dedifferentiation and Poetic Metaphor, 713.
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conceptual system to suggest a state in which the boundaries between
objects are suspended.91
In the original Persian, Rūmī’s first line is a perfect example of a metaphor of the
IMMERSION IN ABSTRACTION schema: “flying IN [immersion] the SKY [abstraction].”

The sky is a seemingly infinite, abstract space without the borders and distinctions that
characterize earthly life. The mental imagery and feelings evoked while imagining
oneself flying effortlessly in the wide expanses of an endless sky is certainly different
from the imagery evoked by the English translations of Nicholson, Arberry, and
Schimmel.
In translating ‘eshq āst dar āsemān parīdan (or even ‘eshq āst bar āsemān
parīdan, as it appears in the Forouzanfar text) as “This is love: to fly
heavenward” (Nicholson), “This is love: to fly to heaven” (Arberry), and “ Look! This is
love – to fly toward the heavens” (Schimmel), they have all translated this line as if the
underlying metaphoric form was of the SOURCE - PATH -GOAL schema variety. This
obviously is not the metaphoric structure underlying the original Persian verse whose
basic IMMERSION IN ABSTRACTION schema has effectively been destroyed by this
seemingly small and innocuous decision to translate dar (“in”) as “to” or “toward.” This
is not an insignificant decision cognitively-speaking, because every word—even small
prepositions like to or in—has the potential to radically change the way we process poetic
imagery and its meaning: in fact, even “[d]eceptively simple looking prepositions like in,

Quote from: Tsur, On the Shores of Nothingness, 233. Also see the rest of this from more on this topic, as
well as: Tsur, 'Oceanic' Dedifferentiation and Poetic Metaphor, 711-24.
91

53

out, over, define elaborate networks of spatial meaning with hundreds of linked schemas,
some of which are prototypical and central.”92
All of the translators also provide a definite destination for the flight (i.e.
“heaven”), which reinforces the SOURCE - PATH -GOAL schema that was initially evoked
by the use of the preposition to. Rūmī, however, does not indicate that love is like flying
to somewhere or towards something; rather, he says that love is like flying in the sky
(IMMERSION IN ABSTRACTION with no definitive destination).
The two very different metaphoric forms that underlie Rūmī’s original verse and
its translations evoke different cognitive schemas, and thus fundamentally alter our
understanding of the meaning communicated by the imagery. Setting out on a journey to/
towards a known location (a JOURNEY metaphor of the SOURCE - PATH -GOAL schema)
is very different than immersing oneself in something vast and unknown (IMMERSION
IN ABSTRACTION schema). More concretely, it is like the difference between
journeying to the sea shore [known, finite] and exploring the ocean [unknown, infinite].
The rest of the ghazal seems to indicate that Rūmī would certainly not want his reader to
stop at the seashore when the ocean is there waiting for him/her to explore!93
Clearly, the decision of Nicholson, Arberry, and Schimmel to use “ heavenward,”
“to heaven,” and “toward heaven” instead of the original “in the sky” (dar/bar āsemān)
not only undermines the “oceanic” and “dedifferentiated” poetic environment in the
original poem, but it also radically changes the metaphoric structure/cognitive schema of
the first line from IMMERSION IN ABSTRACTION to SOURCE - PATH - DESTINATION.
92

Fauconnier, Cognitive Science, 541.
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Rūmī frequently uses the image of the “ocean” to symbolize the soul, God, love, etc.
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Ultimately, these small changes of just a few words fundamentally alter the
understanding of the nature of love as expressed in the first line of the poem: “love” as
exploration in an infinite, division-less environment in the original Persian becomes
“love” as a limited journey with a defined destination in the English translations.

The Metaphoric Structure of Emotions and the Translation of Persian Verbs:
Active Processes versus Reified Concepts
Much has been said in this work about the role of human emotions and their
linguistic expression. I have frequently referred to “human emotional states.” This
expression, however, may not be entirely appropriate. As discussed above, emotions are
dynamic and diffuse processes that affect change within our bodies, both physiologically
and cognitively. They also play a powerful role in prompting all sorts of active emotional
responses (e.g. crying, screaming, displays of affection). It is, therefore, more appropriate
to refer to emotions not as “states of being,” but rather as “forces” that animate our lives.
The cognitive linguist, Zoltán Kövecses, makes this exact point in his detailed
study of the expression of emotion in metaphor. In a wide-ranging study of the use of
“emotional metaphors” in several languages, he concludes that the “master metaphor”
underlying the linguistic expression of emotion is: EMOTIONS ARE FORCES. In other
words, emotions are cognitively understood and expressed as events (e.g. “love knocked
me off my feet,” “he was overcome with sadness”); not as states of being, as often
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thought by both scholars and non-academics. 94 Not surprisingly, this results in the
expression of emotions almost exclusively with motion verbs.95 (Incidentally, Rūmī
advocated just such a view of emotions. See his “Discourse Eleven” in the Fīhi ma Fīhi
for Rūmī’s perspective on the overwhelming force of emotions, and particularly of love.
Here he says that the “drowned person” [i.e. “a mystical lover of God,” in this context]
has no independent motion. Any motion of the lover is really from the beloved [i.e. God]
—in other words, God/Love is the force that moves the true lovers).96
Kövecses’ observation about the fundamental connection between “emotions” and
“motion” has also been corroborated in recent studies by other cognitive scientists. In his
most recent book on emotions, Damasio reports that in lab studies participants of all ages,
when shown a video of geometric shapes moving on a computer screen at varying rates,
assigned emotional values to the shapes’ different rates of movement. He tells us “jagged
fast movements” were considered “angry;” “explosive but harmonious” movements
appeared “joyous;” and “recoiling motions” seemed “fearful” to the participants. Why do
humans imbue movement with emotional qualities? Because, Damasio explains

Kövecses, Metaphor and Emotion (2000), 57-58, 61, 85, 192; Kövecses, Metaphor and Emotion 2008),
385. The reader may object that frequently one will see emotions expressed with common phrases such as
“I am in love” or “He is in depression,” etc. However, as Kövecses notes, underlying this these phrases is
the fact that in order to “be in love” you must move into that state in the first place. The move is occasioned
by the emotion; otherwise you would not be in that particular state. This linguistical expression of “being in
x, y, z” emotional state is also why emotions are almost always conceived of by both scholars and nonscholars as “states,” instead of “forces” [Kövecses, Metaphor and Emotion (2000), 51-53].
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Kövecses, Metaphor and Emotion (2000), 57-58.

Jalāluddīn Rūmī, Signs of the Unseen: The Discourses of Jalāluddīn Rūmī, tr. Thackston M. Wheeler, Jr
(Boston: Shambhala, 1999), 44-54.
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“emotion, as the word indicates, is about movement, about externalized behavior, about
certain orchestrations of reactions to a given cause, within a given environment.”97
Both Kövecses and Damasio’s analyses indicate that motion, and its precise
nature, is crucial in communicating “emotional meaning,” especially at the cognitive
level. In poetry, motion is primarily created through dynamic imagery.98 The mind’s
processing of imagery “as if it were real” (see chapter I, pp. 21-22) actually makes the
creation of “motion” (and, therefore, “emotion”) in poetry easy (for the creative poets!).
In the context of this study, the relevant question is: have Nicholson, Arberry, and
Schimmel translated the “motion” which animates the original Persian texts? I would
argue that they have not. In the first line of all of their translations, they translate parīdan
(a verb in the form traditionally referred to as the “Persian infinitive”) with the English
infinitive “to fly.” This is an interesting choice and it could have been made for a number
of reasons (likely, stylistic). As the Persian language specialist Wheeler M. Thackston
notes, however, “Although in quoting items of vocabulary the Persian infinitive is
equated with the English infinitive, in fact their uses hardly ever coincide.”99 Normally, in
fact, the Persian infinitive (parīdan) is translated into English using the English gerund
(flying).100
In the case of Persian poetry, this is an especially important point. The infinitive
form of Persian verbs (e.g. parīdan) is frequently used in Persian poetry, at least partially,
Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, 70.
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Wheeler M. Thackston, An Introduction to Persian (3rd ed. Bethesda, Md.: Ibex Publishers, 1993), 31.
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Thackston, An Introduction to Persian, 144.
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to preserve poetic rhyme. Since all Persian verbs in the infinitive form end in either -dan
or -tan, poetic rhyme can be easily maintained if the Persian verbs are left unconjugated.
The Persian reader, however, naturally understands that these verbs, while unconjugated,
still clearly indicate unfolding action (i.e. an active process; not a reified concept). This
perception of “motion” in the original Persian is no small matter; indeed, as seen above, it
is essential in communicating the emotional quality embedded in the imagery of the first
line. For this reason, it is unfortunate that Nicholson, Arberry, and Schimmel decide to
use the English infinitive form “to fly.”
The full English infinitive (e.g. “to fly”) can indicate motion, depending on its
position in the sentence and the context. At the same time, it is well known as the
“citation form” of English verbs (i.e. what you would see in a dictionary entry, for
example, “Scream (v) - to yell loudly”). 101 The citation form of a verb is necessarily
understood as the reified concept of the active verb. In other words, it is not understood
cognitively as an active process; but rather as the distilled (non-active) essence of the
active process.
At the very least, this raises the distinct possibility that some readers will process
Nicholson, Arberry, and Schimmel’s translation of the first line in a purely conceptual,
non-active sense. It is also quite possible that the insertion of the demonstrative adjective
this and the colon after “love” in “This is love: to fly...” would facilitate the cognitive
classification of “to fly” as a concept rather than an active process due to the way they

Rodney Huddleston, "The Verb," in The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language, ed Rodney
Huddleston and Geoffrey K. Pullum (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 81. Thackston
mentions this as well, see notes ninety-nine and one hundred.
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both immediately restrict and delimit the poetic environment, and in my opinion, turn it
into something that reads more like an entry in a dictionary than dynamic imagery.
Ultimately, whether the reader processes “to fly” in an active or conceptual sense
is likely to vary from reader to reader.102 However, even the possibility that a reader will
understand “to fly” as a reified conceptual category warrants a new translational approach
to this first line. My alternative translation of the first line is “Love is flying in the sky.” I
have opted for the English gerund because it better communicates the active and
unfolding nature of the Persian verb, and thus preserves the emotive dimension of this
line. I realize that in translating it this way I have created ambiguity as to whether “love”
is: a. doing the flying, or b. is being compared to the action of “flying” in the sky.
Regardless of the understanding the reader adopts, my translation preserves the motive/
emotive dimension of the Persian verb, and thus, I would argue, better translates the
dynamism of the imagery and meaning creation in Rūmī’s original verse ‘ishq āst dar
āsimān parīdan.

“Creating the House of Creation” and the Cognitive Inversion Effect
In this final section, I would like to briefly touch on an interpretive phenomenon
which cognitive scientist Yeshayahu Shen has termed the “inversion effect.” Michael
Sells discusses, what I would describe as, a variety of this phenomenon in his trenchant
comparative study of apophatic discourse. He opens his book with one of the most

The reader’s choice to process the English infinitive “to fly” as either an active process or a reified
concept could be linked to what Tsur describes as “rapid” versus “delayed” categorization styles of
processing [for his discussion of this, please see: Tsur, Aspects of Cognitive Linguistics and Tsur, On the
Shores of Nothingness.
102

59

famous and enigmatic passages from the legendary fourteenth century German Catholic
mystic Meister Eckhart:
Were it the case that a fly had reason and could rationally seek out the
eternal abyss of divine being, from which it came forth, we say that God,
insofar as he is God, could not fulfill or satisfy the fly. Therefore pray God
that we may be free of God.103
Sells explains, however, that one is not likely to find this passage in most editions
and translations of Eckhart’s works because most modern editors and translators have
made an “interpretative decision” to place inverted commas around the second “God” in
the above passage or, alternatively, to make it into a lower-case “god.” Thus, this passage
most often appears with one of the following combinations of editorial interpolations:
“we say that God, in so far as he is ‘God’/god” and “Let us pray God that we may be free
of ‘God’/god.” These interpretative distinctions differentiating God from ‘God’/god
(which do not appear in the original German text produced by Eckhart) are still employed
by most modern editors, translators, and commentators in their effort to make Eckhart’s
apophatic discourse “make more sense” to the reader. As Sells states, however, this
“amounts to a censorship of the fundamental principle of apophatic discourse. That
principle...is the refusal to resolve the apophatic dilemma by posing a distinction between
two kinds of names.”104
In a recent work, cognitive linguist Yeshayahu Shen reports results from a recent
lab study that demonstrates a somewhat similar human tendency for “editorial
interpretative decisions,” which he calls the “inversion effect.” His study examines the
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way in which the human mind processes and interprets different types of abstract similes.
Strikingly, he discovers, when the human mind is confronted with similes that require the
mapping of “less accessible domains” onto “more accessible domains” (e.g. “an anchor is
like a friend”), our minds have a cognitive “tendency” to automatically and
unconsciously flip the direction of the conceptual blending (i.e. “a friend is like an
anchor”) in order to make it more “natural or easier to comprehend.”
This heavy-handed (although unconscious) cognitive editing, however, not only
changes the word order but, more importantly, “radical[ly]” inverts the meaning of the
expression!105 The human “tendency” to make extraordinary “interpretative decisions,”
whether due to theological predispositions or natural cognitive tendencies, can, as Sells
and Shen’s studies both demonstrate, drastically change the meaning expressed by the
original words.
In the English translations of the rather enigmatic line nine of ghazal #1919, I
would argue, there is another clear example of this interpretive phenomenon:
Rūmī’s Persian original:
āz khāne-ye son’ mi-parīdan
tā khāne-ye son’ āfarīdan
Which is translated by Nicholson, Arberry, and Schimmel as follows:
Nicholson:
I was flying away from the (material) workshop
While the workshop was being created.

Yeshayahu Shen, “Metaphor and Poetic Figures,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and
Thought, ed. Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 299, 305-306.
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Arberry:
I was flying from the workshop whilst the workshop was
being created.
Schimmel:
I fled from yonder workshop at a moment
Before the workshop was made and created.
There is, however, a major problem with their translations: the Persian verb
āfarīdan (“to create”) is not passive as they have translated it (“being created/made”); it
is an active verb. This line should, I suggest, be translated as follows:
from the house of creation I was flying
so to create the house of creation.
“Flying from the house of creation” in order “to create the house of creation” (and
by extension, participating in the process of creation itself!), appears cognitively
incoherent and theologically daunting. It seems that in order to reduce the incoherence
that the literal Persian translation must have produced, Nicholson, Arberry, and Schimmel
decided to interpret the verb āfarīdan in a passive sense (“being created”). As in the
examples of Shen’s “inversion effect” we saw above, this “interpretative decision,” to
translate āfarīdan as a passive verb, drastically changes the radical meaning of the
original Persian, which, has very interesting implications indeed!

Conclusion
Michael Sells defines the “meaning event” as “that moment when the meaning
has become identical or fused with the act of predication...”106 The cognitive
understanding of the way the human mind processes language, texts, and their constituent
106

Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying, 9.
62

parts (imagery, metaphor, image schemas, grammar, etc.) adds many new possible
dimensions in which the “meaning” of a text can become fused with its “predication.” In
this chapter, I have discussed several examples of such instances, as well as the ways in
which these instances of “cognitive meaning event creation” have been undermined by
the translations of Nicholson, Arberry, and Schimmel of Rūmī’s ghazal #1919.
To briefly recap, my primary assertions are:

•

The use of “this” reifies, delimits, and restricts the dedifferentiated, diffuse, and warm
poetic environment intended in the original Persian text, which begins simply with the
abstract human emotion ‘eshq (“love”). Moreover, the placement of a colon after
“love” in their translations (“This is love: to fly...) further divides the diffuse,
boundary-less, and oceanic environment evoked by “love.”

•

The translation of the Persian preposition dar (or, bar, in Forouzanfar’s text) as the
English prepositions “to” or “toward,” or adverbially as “heavenward” (in the case of
Nicholson), destroys the IMMERSION IN ABSTRACTION metaphor form/image
schema that is clearly present in the persian original (‘eshq dar/bar āsemān parīdan).
In changing the foundational metaphor form in the first line, the poetic environment
Rūmī creates is drastically altered and the cognitive schema evoked in the reader’s
mind changes from IMMERSION IN ABSTRACTION to SOURCE - PATH DESTINATION. When the cognitive schema is changed, the understanding of the
attendant imagery is fundamentally altered as well. Both these significantly undermine
Rūmī’s dynamic poetic environment and creation of meaning in the original text.
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•

The decision to translate the Persian (“poetic”) infinitive parīdan with the English
infinitive “to fly” creates the distinct possibility that the English reader may process
the first line of the poem in a conceptual (i.e. non-active, reified) manner, instead of in
the dynamic and active sense implied in the original Persian verse. As I discussed in
detail, this would fundamentally change the cognitive understanding of the verse; the
poetic environment created by it; and, especially, the emotive quality perceived by the
reader.

•

Finally, the interpretative decision to translate āfarīdan in line nine of ghazal #1919 as
a passive verb (i.e. the workshop was “being created”) destroys the original and radical
meaning of the Persian, which, I argue, should be translated as “so to create the house
of creation.” This, I have argued, is an example of our natural human cognitive
tendency to interpolate editorial changes into language/texts in order to reduce
cognitive dissonance and to facilitate comprehension.
All of these translation decisions significantly change the cognitive understanding

of this poem, and thus, undermine the dynamic way in which Rūmī has created meaning
in the original Persian verses. Whether taken individually or in the aggregate, all of these
problems demonstrate the considerable utility of cognitive approaches to literature and
their potential to improve both our ability to analyze and translate literature. Moreover,
they highlight the need for a new type of translation—what I have termed here a “cognoerotic” approach to translation—that recognizes, explores, and takes into account the
deeper cogno-poetic processes that animate the poem and turn “the funeral of words into
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a whirling dance.” 107 We must, as literary scholars and translators, utilize the insights
from the cognitive sciences that provide us for the first time a glimpse into the inner
workings of the human mind-brain and its complex “backstage” cognitive processes that
produce language, literature, and meaning. A tool of such great utility cannot afford to be
ignored.
This is an especially important point for those of us working in Persian and Arabic
literature, which have remained almost untouched by cognitive literary theory.108 The
present study then is also a call for those of us in these disciplines to engage this new
body of theory seriously.

107 Keshavarz,

Reading Mystical Lyric, 12, 31. I also indebted to Keshavarz’s work in Flight of the Birds
for the concept of the poem being “animated” by cogno-poetic processes.
The lone exception to this general observation is the innovative work of Fatemeh Keshavarz. See
Keshavarz’s landmark work in Reading Mystical Lyric, Flight of the Birds, and Life as a Stream and the
Psychology of "Moment" in Hafiz's Verse.
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Appendix I:
Translations of Ghazal #1919 by Schimmel, Arberry, and Nicholson
Rūmī, Jalāluddīn. Selected Poems from the Dīvān-e Shams-e Tabrizi of Jalāluddīn
Rūmī. Translated by Reynold A. Nicholson. Bethesda: Ibex, 2001, pp. 136-139.
This is Love: to fly heavenward,
To rend, every instant, a hundred veils.
The first moment, to renounce life;
The last step, to fare without feet.
To regard this world as invisible,
Not to see what appears to one’s self.
‘O heart,’ I said, ‘may it bless thee
To have entered the circle of lovers,
To look beyond the range of the eye,
To penetrate the windings of the bosom!
Whence did this breath come to thee, O my soul,
Whence this throbbing, O my heart?
O bird, speak the language of birds:
I can understand thy hidden meaning.’
The soul answered: ‘I was in the (divine) Factory
While the house of water and clay was a-baking.
I was flying away from the (material) workshop
While the workshop was being created.
When I could resist no more, they dragged me
To mould me into shape like a ball.’
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Rūmī, Jalāluddīn. Mystical Poems of Rūmī: Poems 201-400. Translated by A.J
Arberry. Vol. 2. Westview Press: Boulder, 1979, pp. 31.
This is love: to fly to heaven,
every moment to rend a hundred veils;
At first instance, to break away from breath -first step, to renounce feet;
To disregard this world,
to see only that which you yourself have seen*.
I said, "Heart, congratulations on entering the circle of lovers,
"On gazing beyond the range of the eye, on running into the
alley of the breasts."
Whence came this breath, O heart?
Whence came this throbbing, O heart?
Bird, speak the tongue of birds:
I can heed your cipher!
The heart said, "I was in the factory whilst the home of water
and clay was abaking.
"I was flying from the workshop whilst the workshop was
being created.
"When I could no more resist, they dragged me; how shall I
tell the manner of that dragging?"
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Rūmī, Jalāluddīn. Look! This is Love: Poems of Rūmī. Translated by Annemarie
Schimmel. Boston: Shambhala, 1996, pp. 15-16.
Look! This is love – to fly toward the heavens,
To tear a hundred veils in ev’ry wink,
To tear a hundred veils at the beginning,
To travel in the end without a foot,
And to regard this world as something hidden
And not to see with one’s own seeing eye!
I said: "O heart, may it for you be blessed
To enter in the circle of the lovers,
To look from far beyond the range of eyesight,
To wander in the corners of the bosom!
O soul, from where has come to you this new breath?
O heart, from where has come this heavy throbbing?
O bird, speak now the language of the birds
Because I know to understand your secret!"
The soul replied: "Know, I was in God’s workshop
While He still baked the ‘house of clay and water.’
I fled from yonder workshop at a moment
Before the workshop was made and created.
I could resist no more. They dragged me hither
And they began to shape me like a ball!
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Appendix II:
Lakoff and Johnson’s Table of Primary Metaphors109
AFFECTION IS WARMTH
Subjective Judgment: Affection
Sensorimotor Domain: Temperature
Example: “They greeted me warmly”
Primary Experience: feeling warm while being held affectionately
IMPORTANT IS BIG
Subjective Judgment: Importance
Sensorimotor Domain: Size
Example: “Tomorrow is a big day”
Primary Experience: As a child, finding that big things, e.g. parents, are important and
can exert major forces on you and dominate your visual experience
HAPPY IS UP
Subjective Judgment: Happiness
Sensorimotor Domain: Bodily orientation
Example: “I’m feeling up today.”
Primary Experience: Feeling happy and energetic and having an upright posture
(correlation between affective state and posture)
INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS
Subjective Judgment: Intimacy
Sensorimotor Experience: Being physically close
Example: “We’ve been close for years, but we’re beginning to drift apart.”
Primary Experience: Being physically close to people you are intimate with
BAD IS STINKY
Subjective Judgement: Evaluation
Sensorimotor Domain: Smell
Example: “This movie stinks.”
Primary Experience: Being repelled by foul-smelling objects (correlation between
evaluative and olfactory experience)
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This table is taken from Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 50-54.
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DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS
Subjective Judgment: Difficulty
Sensorimotor Domain: Muscular exertion
Example: “She’s weighed down by responsibilities.”
Primary Experience: The discomfort or disabling effect of lifting or carrying heavy
objects
MORE IS UP
Subjective Judgment: Quantity
Sensorimotor Domain: Vertical orientation
Example: “Prices are high.”
Primary Experience: Observing rise and fall of levels of piles and fluids as more is added
or subtracted
CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS
Subjective Judgment: Perception of kinds
Sensorimotor Domain: Space
Example: “Are tomatoes in the fruit or vegetable category?”
Primary Experience: Observing that things that go together tend to be in he same
bounded region (correlation between common location and common properties,
functions, or origins)
SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS
Subjective Judgement: Similarity
Sensorimotor Domain: Proximity in space
Example: “These colors aren’t quite the same, but they’re close.”
Primary Experience: Observing similar objects clustered together (flowers, trees, rocks,
building, dishes)
LINEAR SCALES ARE PATHS
Subjective Judgment: Degree
Sensorimotor Domain: Motion
Example: “John’s intelligence goes way beyond Bill’s.”
Primary Experience: Observing the amount of progress made by an object in motion
(correlation between motion and scalar notion of degree)
ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE
Subjective Judgement: Abstract unifying relationships
Sensorimotor Domain: Experience of physical objects
Example: “How do the pieces of this theory fit together?”
Primary Experience: Interacting with complex objects and attending to their structure
(correlation between observing part-whole structure and forming cognitive
representations of logical relationships)
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HELP IS SUPPORT
Subjective Judgment: Assistance
Sensorimotor Domain: Physical support
Example: “Support your local charities.”
Primary Experience: Observing that some entities and people require physical support in
order to continue functioning
TIME IS MOTION
Subjective Judgment: The passage of time
Sensorimotor Domain: Motion
Example: “Time flies.”
Primary Experience: Experiencing the passage of time as one moves or observes motion
STATES ARE LOCATIONS
Subjective Judgment: A subjective state
Sensorimotor Experience: Being in a bounded region of space
Example: “I’m close to being in a depression and the next thing that goes wrong will send
me over the edge.”
Primary Experience: Experiencing a certain state as correlated with a certain location
(e.g. being cool under a tree, feeling secure in bed)
CHANGE IS MOTION
Subjective Judgement: Experiencing a change of state
Sensorimotor Domain: Moving
Example: “My car has gone from bad to worse lately.”
Primary Experience: Experiencing the change of state that goes with the change of
location as you move
ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOTIONS
Subjective Judgement: Action
Sensorimotor Experience: Moving your body through space
Example: “I’m moving right along on the project.”
Primary Experience: The common action of moving yourself through space, especially in
the early years of life
PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS
Subjective Judgement: Achieving a purpose
Sensorimotor Experience: Reaching a destination
Example: “He’ll ultimately be successful but he isn’t there yet.”
Primary Experience: Reaching destinations throughout everyday life and thereby
achieving purposes (e.g. if you want a drink, you have to go to the water cooler)
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PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OBJECTS
Subjective Judgment: Achieving a purpose
Sensorimotor Domain: Object manipulation
Example: “I saw an opportunity for success and grabbed it.”
Primary Experience: Grasping a desired object (correlation between satisfaction and
holding a desired physical object)
CAUSES ARE PHYSICAL FORCES
Subjective Judgement: Achieving results
Sensorimotor Domain: Exertion of force
Example: “They pushed the bill through Congress.”
Primary Experience: Achieving results by exerting forces on physical objects to move or
change them
RELATIONSHIPS ARE ENCLOSURES
Subjective Experience: An interpersonal relationship
Sensorimotor Experience: Being in an enclosure
Example: “We’ve been in a close relationship for years, but it’s beginning to seem
confining.”
Primary Experience: Living in the same enclosed physical space with the people you are
most closely related to
CONTROL IS UP
Subjective Judgment: Being in control
Sensorimotor Domain: Vertical orientation
Example: “Don’t worry! I’m on top of the situation.”
Primary Experience: Finding that it is easier to control another person or exert force on
an object from above, where you have gravity working with you
KNOWING IS SEEING
Subjective Judgment: Knowledge
Sensorimotor Domain: Vision
Example: “I see what you mean”
Primary Experience: Getting information through vision
UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING
Subjective Judgment: Comprehension
Sensorimotor Domain: Object manipulation
Example: “I’ve never been able to grasp transfinite numbers.”
Primary Experience: Getting information about an object by grasping and manipulating it
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SEEING IS TOUCHING
Subjective Judgment: Visual perception
Sensorimotor Domain: Touch
Example: “She picked my face out of the crowd.”
Primary Experience: Correlation between the visual and tactile exploration of objects
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